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Abstract
I present a methodology for parameterizing and solving a probabilistic Ricardian model
with two tradable sectors based on Eaton and Kortum (2002), henceforth EK. I make
two changes that generate correlation in product-specific agricultural comparative ad-
vantage across agro-ecologically similar countries and deliver trade elasticities that are
increasing in this correlation. First, I add product heterogeneity stemming from agro-
ecological characteristics to the independently distributed productivity differences in
production technology advanced by EK. Second, I allow trade costs to vary across
products. As in EK, I estimate trade costs using bilateral trade flow data. However, to
account for the additional heterogeneity, I use the simulated method of moments estima-
tor pioneered by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). The modified model successfully
generates large differences in an exporter’s elasticity with respect to its close competitors
versus those that produce a very different set of agricultural products. This produces
substantial differences in the model’s predictions for changes to production and trade
patterns in response to agricultural liberalization compared to those predicted by EK.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Changes in bilateral trade policies have direct effects on trade flows between the two
countries involved, but also indirect effects on those of their competitors. The total
trade effect of a preferential agreement is thus properly described by the magnitude and
distribution of the resulting shifts in bilateral trade flows across exporters. However,
simplifying assumptions on the structure of production in existing quantitative models
of trade result in rather coarse predictions for how patterns of production and trade
shift across countries in response to policy-induced changes in costs in the agricultural
sector.
A central prediction of trade theory is that opening to trade causes countries to
specialize according to comparative advantage. Until recently, most of the empirical
economics literature only considered comparative advantage at the sector or industry-
level. Recent advances have provided the tools to define comparative advantage at the
individual product level in an empirical model by defining technology with heterogeneous
productivity across products. These technologies have been embedded in global general
equilibrium models, most notably by Eaton and Kortum (2002)[1] and Melitz (2003)[2].
I introduce an analytical and empirical methodology that builds on the probabilistic
Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002)[1], henceforth EK. Here, product-level
comparative advantage in the agricultural sector is a function of the interaction between
exporter agro-ecological characteristics and product-specific agro-ecological production
requirements as well as independently distributed productivity differences arising from
a country and sector-specific R&D process. Product-specific trade frictions blunt the
1
2trade-promoting force of comparative advantage due to productivity differences. These
costs arise from differences in shipping and handling costs and trade policy, among other
sources.
The model I present here is the first to my knowledge that integrates non-random
sources of comparative advantage into a heterogeneous productivity trade model. It
is also the first in this literature I am aware of to incorporate product-specific trade
costs. As such, it is the only model built on the EK framework in which changes in
the dispersion of tariffs within sectors can be analyzed. This feature is essential for
meaningful agricultural policy analysis.
Public policy-makers considering a preferential trade agreement are typically at least
as concerned with how gains and losses will be distributed across producers within the
agricultural sector as they are with its effect on consumer welfare. This framework
promises to allow researchers to make more informed predictions for how global pro-
duction patterns are affected by opening to trade and thus provide better support for
those questions. It will also be a useful framework for private sector decision-makers to
explore how policy changes affect optimal global input sourcing and marketing decisions
and for researchers in other disciplines in global agricultural production patterns.
A Point of Reference: The Model
In the model, I countries engage in bilateral trade. Each country has producers in two
tradable sectors: manufacturing and agriculture, and in a non-tradable services sector.
The agriculture and manufacturing sectors are each comprised of a unit continuum of
products that are differentiated only in terms of their intrinsic characteristics. As in
the multi-sector extensions of the EK framework of Caliendo and Parro (2012)[3] and
Shikher (2012)[4], the sectors are linked through intermediate inputs.
A sector- and country-specific R&D process generates product-specific technologies
that differ in terms of their productive efficiency. As in EK, these productivity differ-
ences are independently distributed across products. Unlike EK, there is a second source
of productivity differences in the agriculture sector which comes from the coincidence of
product-specific agro-ecological production requirements and exporters’ agro-ecological
characteristics. These productivity differences create comparative advantage within the
sector and thus provide a natural explanation for agricultural trade, even among similar
3countries.
Exporters are assumed to face ad valorem trade costs to access foreign markets.
These costs are assumed constant within the manufacturing sector as in EK. In contast, I
allow trade costs to be product-specific in the agricultural sector. Systematic variation in
trade costs across agricultural products is generated by intrinsic product characteristics
such as perishability, and by differential policy treatment.
Exporter-level market shares are derived as the aggregate outcomes of revealed
product-level comparative advantage. The direct effect of lower bilateral trade costs
in the model is an expansion in the set of products an exporter sells to the importing
country. The indirect effect on a third countrys market share in the import market
depends on the extent to which this expansion eats into the set of products it sells to
the importing country.
Key Features of Agricultural Production and Trade
A model that abstracts from non-random sources of agricultural comparative advantage
and their distribution across exporters ignores fundamental determinants of the struc-
ture of the competitive environment in which agricultural producers operate. It will
thus yield imprecise if not misleading predictions for the distribution of trade effects
due to a change in bilateral trade barriers.
Individual agricultural products are plants and animals. As such, they vary in-
trinsically in terms of the amount of moisture, soil type, thermal climate and other
environmental conditions in which they are most successfully cultivated. Comparative
advantage in a given agricultural product is most likely to emerge in countries whose nat-
ural resource endowment has features that coincide with its ideal production conditions.
Importantly, environmental conditions are not uniformly distributed across countries.
Exporters with similar environmental conditions are more likely to have comparative
advantage in similar products in international agricultural markets. The magnitude and
distribution of the direct and indirect effects of a change in bilateral trade costs thus
depends non-trivially on the pair of countries involved.
The framework I present generates a more complex description of the competitive
environment in the agricultural sector by identifying countries likely to compete head to
head in global markets in the same agricultural products based on similarities in their
4agricultural endowments. The model is thus able to generate a more nuanced picture of
the effects of policy on global patterns of production and trade. As just one example,
the model sensibly predicts that market share of the United States’ closest competitor
Canada, is over ten-times more responsive to changes in US tariffs than is tropical Costa
Rica.
Dispersion of Agricultural Trade Costs
Heterogeneous productivity models with a continuum of goods have provided tools to
conceptualize product-specific differences in trade costs. However, these models impose
strong assumptions on the distribution of product heterogeneity in order to deliver
convenient analytical forms for structural equations, which prevent analysis of anything
more complex than changes in average trade costs. However, tariffs, transportation fees
and other costs associated with exporting vary significantly and systematically across
agricultural products. Agricultural products like fresh berries that are highly perishable
have costly handling and transportation requirements while most grains can be shipped
in bulk in relatively standard cargo containers. Import tariffs on dairy, cotton, sugar
and rice are consistently among the highest in markets around the world.
Moreover, particularly in the case of tariffs and other policy barriers, the distribution
of trade costs across products is typically the central focus of policy analysis. Consumers
of agricultural policy analysis in the public and private sector are rarely interested in
the effects of changes in the average agricultural subsidy or the average tariff. It is
almost always the product-specific divergences from average that interest negotiators of
trade agreements, agricultural producers and industrial users of agricultural products.
The flexibility of the model I present here, in terms of its ability to incorporate
product-specific policy, is therefore a substantial contribution. To my knowledge it is
the first heterogeneous productivity model in which changes in the distribution of these
costs across products within sectors can be studied.
Imperfect Cross-Country Substitution
In the EK framework, all productivity differences are assumed to be independent across
products and trade costs are constant and ad valorem. These two assumptions deliver
convenient analytical solutions for the model’s key structural equations, but they also
5have counter-intuitive implications. First, they imply that specialization patterns are
randomly determined. As an illustrative example, this means that Colombia just hap-
pens to be a more competitive coffee exporter than Canada because of the random
chance process that assigned it a high productivity coffee technology.
These assumptions are counter-intuitive on their face. More troubling is that they
also impose strong restrictions on how trade patterns shift in response to changes in
bilateral trade costs. Namely, they imply that the direct effect of bilateral trade liberal-
ization on market share is virtually the same for every pair of countries. Furthermore,
they imply that the indirect effect of a change in an exporter’s bilateral trade costs is
identical for all of its competitors’ market shares, regardless of whether they are likely to
compete head-to-head in the same products. Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare
(2012)[5] dub these features of the EK framework a “CES import demand system”. Im-
portantly, the authors point out that the CES import demand system is also a feature
of other quantitative trade models, including those built on the Melitz (2003)[2] or the
Armington assumption.
As an example of the peculiar substitution patterns this implies, suppose the United
States cuts tariffs on all agricultural products imported from Colombia. The EK model
would predict that Colombia will gain market share in the US at the expense of its
competitors, who all lose an equal proportion of their US market share. That is, the
EK model predicts identical drops in both Canadian and Costa Rican market share in
response to lower Colombian tariffs. Basic reasoning, on the other hand, would lead one
to expect Costa Rica’s market share to fall proportionally more than Canada’s.
In the model I introduce here, product-specific comparative advantage is no longer
random. It is determined in part by agro-ecological characteristics. Countries with
similar characteristics are likely to be competitive in the same products, everything else
equal. This generates correlation in comparative advantage across countries and delivers
elasticities of substitution (and thus indirect effects) between competing exporters that
are increasing in this correlation.
Variation in Intensity of Global Competition across Products
In the EK framework, the intensity of competition is described by the cross-country
variation in prices offered in a given market. If countries offer similar prices for the
6same product, international competition is intense and changes in trade costs are likely
to cause shifts in trade patterns. If prices vary widely, it suggests that high-productivity
technology or low trade costs are only available to producers in a few countries. In this
case, marginal changes in trade costs are less likely to shift trade patterns. The nature
of the intensity of competition in products traded between two partners can therefore
have sizeable effects on the magnitude of the direct and indirect effects of bilateral
liberalization.
Under the EK framework assumptions of independently distributed productivity and
constant ad valorem trade costs, the intensity of competition is constant across products.
However, this is a strong assumption for global agriculture markets. Some agricultural
products require more specific or rare environmental conditions than others. While a
soybean seed will yield a crop almost everywhere, cocoa beans can only be grown under
very specific conditions that exist in relatively few countries. Basic microeconomic
theory thus suggests that cross-country competition for market share is more intense in
soybeans than cocoa.
In my model, the dispersion of productivity across countries is product specific.
The magnitude of direct and indirect trade effects of bilateral trade liberalization in an
import market is determined by the aggregate effect of product-specific sensitivity to
trade costs over products consumed in that market.
Simonovska and Waugh (2011)[6] make a significant contribution to the literature
on heterogeneous productivity trade models by offering an unbiased estimator for the
single parameter that governs the constant dispersion of productivity across products
in the EK framework. The authors argue that a crucial advantage of the heterogeneous
productivity trade models is that the underlying micro-structure delivers a better basis
for estimating this parameter and thus trade elasticities. My approach supports and
extends their argument, demonstrating that heterogeneous productivity models can
allow for a more complex characterization of elasticity in cases where it is necessary
because the strength of comparative advantage varies non-trivially across products.
Estimating Trade Costs and Productivity Distribution Parameters
A central and desirable feature of the EK model is a structural equation that implies
a log-linear gravity-like relationship between trade flows, exporter characteristics and
7trade costs. This equation is used to estimate trade costs and the parameters of the
productivity distribution. These are the key parameters describing bilateral trade flows
in the general equilibrium model. This basic structure is retained in my model, but the
modifications to technology and trade costs complicate the equation such that it can no
longer be estimated with linear methods.
I show that the distribution of trade costs and absolute advantage can be obtained
from the same structural relationship by specifying it as a random-coefficients logit
model. I estimate a set of parameters describing the distribution of trade costs and
productivity across agricultural products using methods pioneered in the literature on
differentiated products demand systems by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)[7], hence-
forth BLP. This empirical technique allows me to connect the product-level conceptual
model to sector-level trade flow data without making strong distributional assumptions,
as in EK and others.
In the empirical model, individual products are defined by their agro-ecological pro-
duction requirements and trade costs. Neither of these is directly observable. However,
the BLP methodology only requires information on the distribution of production re-
quirements and trade costs across products consumed in each import market.
I assume that information on key product-specific agro-ecological production re-
quirements can be implicitly obtained from the distribution of production across re-
gions. Information on product-specific trade costs can be obtained from disaggregated
data on tariffs and other trade policies. Additional unobservable or unquantifiable
product-specific requirements and costs are represented by random variables drawn
from a parametric distribution.
This paper represents the first time to my knowledge that a gravity-like representa-
tion of trade flows has been specified as a random parameters logit model. It is almost
certainly unique in its use of the BLP methodology. Its value, however, is not limited to
extensions of the EK model. Any model in which the relationship between expenditure
shares and trade costs takes the form of a logit probability can be extended in this
manner. Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012)[5] demonstrate that models
based on the Armington framework and that of Melitz (2003)[2] can also meet this
requirement1 .
1 The assumption that the relationship between trade costs and market shares take the logit form
8This is not the first time the gravity model has been estimated using a discrete choice
methodology. In fact, EK makes note of the similarity between the structural equation
from which the log-linear gravity model is derived and the discrete choice literature in a
footnote. Anderson (2011)[8] references earlier efforts by Savage and Deutsch (1960)[9]
and Leamer and Stern (1970)[10] to develop structural gravity models within the discrete
choice framework. However, the context of these models is quite different from what I
present here. Anderson describes these models as positing international transactions as
a result of the choice of an individual trader, whose decision of the source country to
purchase from is influenced by traditional gravity variables.
The model embedded in the EK framework turns this upside down. In a sense, it is
the individual product making a “choice” of a source country in which to be produced.
This “choice” is influenced by agro-ecological requirements that are non-randomly dis-
tributed across countries and idiosyncratic technological productivity available in each
country. In the model I present here, buyers are simply responding to the prices that
reflect these “choices” made by products.
An Alternative Approach
While the CES import demand system may not provide a reasonable forecast of the
responses to changes in agricultural trade costs at the sector level, it will hold for
some appropriately-defined subset of products. A reasonable approach might therefore
be to break up the agricultural sector into sub-sectors. On its face, this is a more
straightforward than the approach I suggest here. However, assuming that sufficiently
disaggregated data are even available, identifying the boundaries of these sub-sectors
within agriculture would require extensive additional research. For some product types
like fruit, the boundaries might be obvious. For others, like grains, oilseeds and livestock
products, the degree and manner in which these products will need to be divided into
subsectors is less clear. Moreover, the divisions under which the CES import demand
system holds are unlikely to be the same in every import market.
The BLP method delivers the considerable benefit that comparative advantage in
agriculture can exist product-by-product on the continuum without requiring the re-
searcher to define which countries and products within the agricultural sector are similar
is Assumption R3 in Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012).
9a priori or assume that the set of goods in which a country has comparative advan-
tage is fixed or exogenous. Instead of having the researcher tell the model that tropical
countries produce tropical products, the BLP methodology allows the data to tell the
researcher.
Policy Analysis
The model I introduce is expressly designed for empirical policy analysis of agricultural
markets in an open economy setting. However, the immediate focus of this thesis is to
introduce and demonstrate this novel and flexible methodology as clearly as possible.
The cost of the model’s flexibility is a degree of complexity. In order to focus on the
methodology in what follows I keep the specification of the distribution of heterogeneity
as lean as possible.
In Chapter 4 I carry out two counterfactual experiments. These experiments are
designed to demonstrate the value and flexibility of this approach for policy analysis,
but given the highly stylized way in which I present and calibrate the model here, the
results they produce should not be used to evaluate the general equilibrium model or be
relied upon as serious policy analysis. Future applications of this framework will require
a more purposeful specification of the productivity and trade cost distributions.
Background
Previous general equilibrium analyses of the impact of agricultural trade liberalization
have largely been conducted using CGE models with an Armington assumption on
preferences (see Anderson (2011)[8] for several references). These models assume the
set of goods in which each country has comparative advantage is fixed and exogenously
determined. The composition of bilateral trade is thus unaffected by liberalization,
i.e., changes in trade flows are exclusively at the intensive margin. Sector-level trade
patterns are essentially locked-in.
Kehoe (2003)[11] provides perhaps the most compelling source of motivation for my
approach. The paper provides an ex post evaluation of a set of influential Armington
models designed to forecast the effects of the NAFTA. Kehoe reveals that these models
did a uniformly poor job predicting the effect NAFTA would have on trade flows. He
suggests the mechanism driving trade in these models is faulty, making them inadequate
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for the study of the effect of trade liberalization on patterns of global production and
trade. Kehoe anticipates that a Ricardian approach built on the two country model of
Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977)[12] may offer a better characterization of the
forces that compel two countries to trade and would thus bet better suited to predict the
trade effects of liberalization. The EK framework is, in fact, a many-country extension
of the Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson framework.
My work is most similar to that of Caliendo and Parro (2012)[3] and Shikher
(2012)[4], who develop multi-sector extensions of the EK framework explicitly for trade
policy analysis. These authors introduce multiple tradable sectors into the EK model
by allowing trade costs and average productivity to differ across sectors within countries
and linkages among sectors via their intermediate input use. They distinguish sectors
by allowing trade costs and the parameters of the productivity distribution to vary
across industries. While these models do allow the forces driving competition to differ
at the sector level, their approaches are still restrictive because they take no account of
intra-sectoral specialization. Unless sub-sectors happen to be defined such that changes
in trade flows in response to policy change are proportional to market share, this will
produce imprecise predictions for patterns of production and bilateral trade.
Both Shikher (2012)[4] and Caliendo and Parro (2012)[3] evaluate the Ricardian
approach by simulating the changes in trade costs that comprise the NAFTA in multi-
sector extensions of the EK model. Both papers demonstrate that EK-style models
offer superior predictions for the relative magnitudes of the direct trade flow effects
of the NAFTA within North America. They demonstrate that their approach offers a
substantial improvement over Armington models in its ability to forecast the distribution
of trade flow responses across sub-sectors. In both papers the focus is primarily on trade
in manufactured goods. Shikher focuses on manufacturing sub-sectors exclusively.
The model I introduce in this thesis contributes to the literature on international
trade with heterogeneous productivity on both a conceptual and empirical level. To my
knowledge, it is the first contribution to this literature that incorporates non-random
sources of comparative advantage within sectors. This allows for at least partially
endowment-driven trade.
It is also consistent with a fundamental stylized fact of the effect of trade policy
11
on patterns of trade that is not captured by a CES import demand system. By exam-
ining highly disaggregated bilateral trade data Kehoe and Ruhl (2013)[13] document
a consistent feature of how the response of trade flows to liberalization varies across
products. Namely, the largest percent increase in trade between two countries after
bilateral liberalization is in the set of products that were least-traded prior to liberal-
ization. Conversely, the share of the products that were most traded diminishes. The
model of agricultural trade I present can convey this pattern. In fact, it is a natural
implication of the analytical model.
The empirical contribution of my approach is also significant. The BLP estimation
approach allows the researcher to introduce additional information on the drivers of
comparative advantage and trade costs, providing a more nuanced analysis. It also
opens the door for research on how factor endowments or other natural or economic
characteristics of exporters affect intra-sector specialization. This feature may be ap-
pealing to researchers interested the link between trade patterns and the environmental
conditions in which production takes place. As such, it is worthwhile to explore the
model’s potential for evaluating the effects of environmental phenomena such as climate
change and agricultural trade and production patterns.
The analytical and empirical model I introduce in this paper has been informed by
a great deal of work that is not directly referenced herein. A list of further reading that
contains the additional resources I consulted while developing this approach is available
in Appendix A.
Thesis Structure
In the next chapter, as a point of departure to my contribution, I introduce the standard
EK technology and trade cost assumptions that deliver the log-linear gravity-like struc-
tural equation which is used to parameterize the general equilibrium model. I show that
the EK assumptions place strong restrictions on cross-country substitution patterns and
argue that they are counter-intuitive for agricultural trade. I then conduct econometric
tests which confirm these restrictions are not supported by agricultural trade data.
In Chapter 3 I modify the EK assumptions on technology and trade costs and
derive a structural relationship corresponding to EK’s gravity-like model of trade flows.
I demonstrate how these changes generate a range of trade elasticities in each import
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market then estimate the parameters describing bilateral trade patterns by specifying
the relationship as a random coefficients logit model.
In Chapter 4 I embed the modified agriculture sector technology and trade cost as-
sumptions into a general equilibrium model with two tradable sectors and conduct two
counterfactual experiments. The first calculates simulated general equilibrium elastic-
ities with respect to the United States, Canada, France and Costa Rica in the model
I present and in a model that maintains the EK structure for the agricultural sector
to compare the predictions of the EK and modified model. The second experiment
demonstrates the flexibility of the modified model by exploring the difference between
full and partial agricultural trade liberalization, an analysis which cannot be performed
in the EK framework since trade costs are assumed constant within sectors.
Chapter 2
Motivation: The Independence of
Irrelevant Exporters
In this chapter, as a point of departure to my contribution, I introduce the EK model
assumptions on technology and trade costs and derive the gravity-like structural equa-
tion that is used to estimate trade costs and absolute advantage. These are the key
parameters that describe global production and bilateral trade patterns and their re-
sponses to changes in trade costs in the general equilibrium model. I show that the EK
assumptions place strong and counter-intuitive restrictions on cross-country substitu-
tion patterns, revealing what Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2011)[5] refer
to as a CES import demand structure. Finally, I adapt and carry out econometric tests
from the discrete choice literature which confirm these restrictions are not supported
by agricultural trade data.
2.1 An EK-style Model of Agricultural Trade
The global economy is comprised of I countries. All countries are engaged in bilateral
agricultural trade. Exporters are indexed by i and importers by n. The agricultural
sector is comprised of a continuum of tradable products differentiated only by their
intrinsic properties. Individual agricultural products are indexed by j. In each country,
consumers buy agricultural products for final consumption and firms buy them to use
as intermediate inputs. All buyers in market n purchase each product from the one
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source country that offers the lowest price.
Production technology is product-specific within each country, where it is used by
many, perfectly-competitive individual producers. An amount qAi (j) of product j can
be produced in country i with technology that is a Cobb-Douglas function of factors
and intermediate inputs:
qAi (j) = z
A
i (j)(N
A
i
βAi LAi
(1−βAi ))
αAi
QAi
(1−αAi ) (2.1)
where NAi is labor; L
A
i is land; and Q
A
i is an aggregate of intermediate inputs from
agriculture and other sectors of the economy.
The term zAi (j) is a productivity-augmenting random variable specific to product
j in country i. Technological productivity, zAi (j) is independently distributed across
products following a Frechet distribution with parameters TAi and θ:
FAzn(z) = exp{−TAi z−θ} (2.2)
The value of TAi is assumed to emerge from the country-specific R&D process described
in Eaton and Kortum (1999)[14]. A high value of TAi means country i is more likely
to have a high draw of zAi (j). As such, it represents country i’s absolute advantage in
the agricultural sector. The parameter θ > 1 governs the dispersion of productivity. A
smaller θ implies larger productivity differences.
Producers in exporter i face additional costs τAni ≥ 1, to sell a product in import
market n. These trade costs are assumed to take the iceberg form, with τAnn = 1 and
τAni ≥ τAnjτAji . With perfect competition, producers set prices equal to the unit cost of
producing the product and selling it in market n. Therefore, the price offered by country
i producers to buyers in market n for good j is:
pAni(j) =
cAi τ
A
ni
zAi (j)
(2.3)
where cAi is the cost of an agricultural input bundle in country i. Buyers in market n
purchase product j from the source country that offers the lowest price.
Notice that the sole source of variation in exporter i’s price offers comes from pro-
ductivity differences, zAi (j). The productivity dispersion parameter θ fully describes
the variation in price offers and thus the force exerted by comparative advantage to
15
promote trade in the face of trade barriers. Larger values of θ imply that productivity
differences across countries are small. In this case global competition is intense and the
cost advantage provided by a high realization of zAi (j) for producers in exporter i is
more likely to be overcome by trade costs.
Moreover, the assumption that zAi (j) is independently distributed implies that the
set of agricultural products in which a county specializes is determined entirely ran-
domly. To allude to how this assumption will produce counter-intuitive predictions in
the agricultural sector, consider an illustration: The independence assumption implies
that the only reason Colombia specializes in coffee is that its R&D process happened
to generate a high efficiency coffee production technology. Such a technology is as least
as likely to have manifested in Canada rather than Colombia and would have, in turn,
translated directly into comparative advantage for Canadian coffee producers.
Invoking a law of large numbers, EK shows that the share of agricultural expenditure
spent on imports from country i is equal to the probability it offers the lowest price.
The assumptions on the distribution of zAi (j) yield:
Pr
(
pAni(j) = p
A
n (j)
) ≡ piAni = TAi (cAi τAni)−θI∑
l=1
TAl (c
A
l τ
A
nl)
−θ
(2.4)
where pAn (j) = mini{pAni(j)}. This expression is normalized by the domestic share of
agricultural expenditure piAnn, and specified to yield a log-linear parametric expression
from which trade costs can be estimated.
To specify equation 2.4, EK define:
SAi ≡ lnTAi − θ ln cAi (2.5)
Trade costs are proxied by variables common to gravity models following EK, Waugh
(2010)[15] and others as:
lnτAni = b
A
ni + l
A
ni +
6∑
r=1
dArni + ex
A
i + EU
A
ni +NAFTA
A
ni + ξ
A
ni
where bAni and l
A
ni are coefficients on dummy variables indicating that exporter i and
market n share a border or common language, respectively; dArni is the coefficient on a
dummy variable equal to one if the two countries are in distance category r ∈ [1, 6];
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exAi is a country fixed effect that captures exporter-specific agricultural trade costs;
1
EUAni and NAFTA
A
ni are coefficients on dummy variables indicating intra-EU and
intra-NAFTA trade respectively, and ξAni is a mean-zero error term that is assumed to
be orthogonal to the other regressors. Substituting these into equation 2.4, normalizing
by piAnn, and taking logs yields a gravity-like model of agricultural trade flows:
ln
(
piAni
piAnn
)
= SAi −SAn −θ
(
bAni + l
A
ni +
∑
r
dArni + ex
A
i + EU
A
ni +NAFTA
A
ni + ξ
A
ni
)
(2.6)
This expression is estimated using linear methods with country fixed effects to capture
SAi and ex
A
i . Estimates of the location parameter of the agricultural productivity dis-
tribution TAi , are obtained from Sˆ
A
i using equilibrium relationships. Estimates of τ
A
ni
and TAi are then used to parameterize the agricultural sector in the general equilibrium
model.
2.2 Substitution Patterns in the EK Model
The primary disadvantage of the EK model for agricultural policy analysis lies in its
strong and often counter-intuitive implications for the elasticity of bilateral trade flows
with respect to changes in trade costs. The elasticity defines the percent change in
market share that results from a change in bilateral trade costs and as such, the system
of bilateral elasticities fully describes the magnitude and distribution of direct and
indirect effects of trade liberalization discussed in Chapter 1.
Equation 2.6 displays the elasticity of piAni with respect to a change in bilateral trade
costs between its competitor country l and the importing country n, holding all prices
constant:
∂piAni
∂τAnl
τAnl
piAni
=
{
−θ(1− piAnl) if l = i
θpiAnl otherwise
(2.7)
Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare define this as a CES input demand system and
note that it is a feature of models built on the EK framework as well as many of those
built on Melitz (2003)[2] and on the Armington assumption. The simplicity of equation
2.7 is one of the most appealing features of the EK model. However, its usefulness for
1 EK includes importer fixed effect in trade costs, whereas Waugh (2010) demonstrates that an
exporter fixed effect is more appropriate.
17
applied policy analysis is limited if the CES import demand structure does not hold in
the data.
In fact, the CES import demand system imposes strong restrictions on both own-
country and cross-country market share elasticity with respect to trade costs. Since
(1− piAni) ≈ 1 for almost every pair of countries, Equation 2.7 implies that own-country
elasticities, which describe the direct effect of a change in bilateral trade costs, are
virtually equal to θ for every exporter in every import market. To the extent it varies
at all, own-country elasticity is strictly decreasing in piAni. This is an unnecessary and
possibly inappropriate assumption for agricultural markets.
To see why, consider an example. Coˆte d’Ivoire is the global leader in cocoa exports
and dominates UK cocoa imports. Yet, its total share of the UK agricultural products
market is very small. The EK model would predict Coˆte d’Ivoire’s market share is
more own-country elastic than e.g., Germany, which has a relatively large share of the
UK agricultural products market. Germany’s agricultural exports to the UK primarily
consist of grains and meats that can be produced competitively by producers in many
countries, including domestic producers. The EK model’s predictions would thus run
counter to basic microeconomic theory, which would suggest German market share
should be more elastic than that of Coˆte d’Ivoire.
Similarly, equation 2.7 suggests that cross-country elasticities, which describe the
indirect effects of a change in bilateral trade costs, are miniscule in almost every market
for almost every pair of exporters since piAnl is very small for almost every pair of countries.
Moreover, any change in a competing exporter’s bilateral trade costs τAnl, has the same
effect on piAni for all i 6= l, including the domestic producers market share piAnn. This is a
highly illogical assumption for the agricultural sector.
Consider the following example: Suppose the United States raises its tariffs on all
Costa Rican agricultural products. This results in a decline in Costa Rica’s market
share to the extent that these tariffs mean it no longer offers the lowest price for some
of the products it had been exporting. Ecuador and The Netherlands have virtually
identical shares of the US agricultural products market. Equation 2.7 thus implies
that US buyers will substitute equally toward products from each of these countries.
However, Ecuador’s climate suggests it is more likely than The Netherlands to offer
low prices in agricultural products once exported by Costa Rica. Contrary to the EK
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model’s predictions, one would thus expect agricultural trade flows from Ecuador to
increase more than those of The Netherlands in response to higher Costa Rican tariffs.
2.3 The Independence of Irrelevant Exporters
The assumption that cross-country elasticity is symmetric across competitors within
an import market, which characterizes the CES import demand system, is identical
to one that arises frequently in the discrete choice literature where it is known as the
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. Under the IIA property, a third
country’s trade costs are “irrelevant” to the ratio of market shares of any other two
competitors.
Tests for the presence of the IIA property are well-established in the discrete choice
literature. In what follows, I adapt two such tests that can be based on the results of
estimating Equation 2.6. First I discuss the data set I use to conduct these tests. This
is the base data set that I will use throughout this thesis.
Data
The data set is comprised of bilateral shares of agricultural expenditure for 42 countries
in the year 2000. I selected this sample of countries using information from the World
Bank World Development Indicators[16] to assemble a list of the countries with the
50 highest GDP per capita and the 50 highest share of agricultural raw materials in
agricultural value added. This yields 93 total countries.
I constructed bilateral market shares using production and trade data from the UN
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)[17] for the year 2000. FAO production and
trade data is available at the “item” level of aggregation. The FAO item-level classifi-
cation does not correspond directly to a particular level in the HS or ISIC classification
systems, but both trade and production data are classified under the same codes. I com-
piled a set of 177 agricultural items for which data on both bilateral trade and the gross
value of production in US dollars are available. Countries for which complete trade and
production data was not available for both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors2
for the year 2000 were dropped from the sample.
2 The manufacturing sector data is used in the general equilibrium model in Chapter 4.
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I also dropped eleven countries that had available trade and production data, but
zero bilateral trade flows for more than half of the import markets in the data set.
The impact of zero dependent variables on parameter estimates is an important issue
for research that relies on the log-linear gravity equation. I do not pursue analysis of
the robustness of the results of equation 2.6 to the treatment of zero trade observations
here since my focus is on introducing an alternative framework that does not rely on the
log-linear gravity model to estimate trade costs. I replace the remaining zero bilateral
trade flows with $1 flows.
I aggregate bilateral trade flows and production over the 177 items in my data and
use these values to calculate bilateral expenditure shares
XAni
XAn
, where XAni is the total
value of the agricultural trade flow from country i to country n. I calculate XAn as
the sum of total production plus total agricultural imports less total exports of the 177
agricultural products. Domestic shares are calculated as X
A
nn
XAn
= 1−
I∑
i 6=n
XAni
XAn
.
I assemble the trade cost proxy variables using the CEPII gravity dataset of Head,
Mayer and Ries (2010)[18] available for download from www.cepii.fr. The border vari-
able is a dummy variable equal to 1 if two countries share a border. The language
variable equals one if at least 9% of the population in both countries speaks a common
language. The CEPII data set provides measures of the geodesic distance between two
countries. I use the population-weighted average distance between the largest cities of
the two countries. As in EK and Waugh (2010)[15], I classify distance into six categories
(see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1: Definition of Distance Variables
Variable Distance, miles
Distance 1 [0,375)
Distance 2 [375,750)
Distance 3 [750,1500)
Distance 4 [1500,3000)
Distance 5 [3000,6000)
Distance 6 [6000,maximum]
The final component of the data set is the producer and exporter effects SAi and ex
A
i .
I normalize these effects so that coefficients sum to zero as in Waugh (2011)[15]. As such,
these estimates are interpreted with respect to the average country: Values of SAi greater
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than one indicate that exporter i producers are more competitive in agriculture than the
average country. Values of exAi greater than one suggest that country i exporters face
higher than average exporter-specific trade costs. Coefficient estimates for producer
fixed effects SAi are reported in Appendix B and estimates for exporter fixed effects
exAi are reported in Appendix C. Coefficient estimates for the remaining variables are
presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 below.
2.4 Test One: Hausman and McFadden
The first test of whether agricultural trade is consistent with the CES import demand
system is suggested by Hausman and McFadden (1984)[19]. The logic of this test is
that if a third countrys trade costs are irrelevant to the relative market share of any two
other exporters in a given market, i.e., if the CES import demand system holds, then
parameter estimates from estimating equation 2.6 on any subset of countries should not
be significantly different from those obtained from the full data set.
To see this, let I be the full set of agricultural exporters and let IS be a subset of
those exporters. It is straightforward to show that under the CES demand system:
piAni|I = pi
A
ni|IS × piAnIS
where piAni|I is the probability exporter i offers the lowest price among all global exporters;
piAni|IS is the probability it offers the lowest price among exporters in subset IS ; and pi
A
nIS
is the probability the lowest price offer in market n comes from an exporter in subset
IS . Therefore:
3
piAni|I
piAnn|I
=
piAni|IS
piAnn|IS
Define the true value of the coefficients obtained by estimating equation 2.6 as β∗.4
Define a partition of the coefficients β∗ = [β∗1,β
∗
2], where β
∗
1 is comprised of the
coefficients that vary both within the full data set and the subset IS and β
∗
2 is comprised
of the coefficients that do not vary within subset IS . That is, β
∗
2 includes fixed effects for
3 Note that this condition suggests that if the IIA property holds, dropping zero trade observations
from the sample when estimating equation (5) will not itself bias the parameter estimates.
4 β∗ = [S∗, b∗, l∗, d∗, ex∗, EU∗, NAFTA∗]
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countries that have been excluded to form IS as well as EUni, NAFTAni if no members
are in the subset IS .
Under standard OLS assumptions the coefficient estimate βˆ
I
= [βˆ
I
1, βˆ
I
2], obtained
from estimating equation 2.6 on the full set of countries is a consistent estimate of β∗
and the coefficient estimate βˆ
IS ≡ βˆIS1 obtained from estimating 2.6 on the subset IS
is a consistent estimate of β∗1. If the IIA property holds, there will be no statistically
significant difference between βˆ
I
1 and βˆ
IS
1 . If not βˆ
IS
1 is not a consistent estimate of β
∗
1.
Small and Hsiao (1985)[20] show that under the null hypothesis that the IIA property
holds, the test statistic:
H =
(
βˆ
IS
1 − βˆ
I
1
)′ (Σˆ
I
)−1 (
βˆ
IS
1 − βˆ
I
1
)
5
follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the rank of the matrix:
Σˆ =
I
IS
cov(βˆ
IS
1 )− cov(βˆ
I
1)
The first step in carrying out this test is to define the subset of exporters IS . With
42 exporters in my data set there are thousands of possible candidates. Unfortunately
there is no formal theory to determine which countries should be excluded in order to
define IS for the optimal test.
Small and Hsiao (1985)[20] suggest choosing a subset by eliminating close substi-
tutes. I hypothesize that countries that are close substitutes in an import market are
similar in terms of their agro-ecological features and distance from the import market.
These countries are most likely to compete head-to-head for market share in the same
products and therefore have larger cross-country trade elasticities.
I run the Hausman and McFadden test twice, removing two subsets of countries
that I expect to have relatively large cross-country trade elasticities. For the first test
I create a subset IS that excludes the South American countries that produce mainly
tropical products. Results are reported in Table 2.2 under Test 1. Next I run the test,
forming IS by excluding Indonesia and Malaysia and report the results under Test 2.
Both of these tests soundly reject the null hypothesis that the IIA property holds in the
agricultural trade data.
5 Small and Hsiao (1984) present this test statistic, which adjusts the Hausman and McFadden
statistic for differences in sample size between I and IS .
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Table 2.2: Hausman-McFadden Test Results
Null Hypothesis: βˆ
I
1 = βˆ
IS
1
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
Test Statistic - 3929.34 21337.14 8477.52
Selected
Variables
βˆ
I
1 βˆ
IS
1 βˆ
IS
1 βˆ
IS
1
Border 0.75* 0.72 0.83* 1.29**
Language 1.49*** 1.19*** 1.61*** 1.63***
EU -2.62*** -2.52*** -2.54*** -1.99***
NAFTA -1.64 -1.98 -1.35 -2.11
Distance 1 -5.89*** -5.34*** -6.21*** -6.07***
Distance 2 -8.47*** -7.84*** -8.70*** -8.90***
Distance 3 -10.27*** -9.91*** -10.45*** -10.75***
Distance 4 -11.87*** -11.7*** -12.02*** -12.02***
Distance 5 -13.91*** -14.22*** -13.97*** -14.08***
Distance 6 -15.00*** -14.95*** -15.07*** -15.21***
*Significance at the 10% level; **Significance at the 5% level; ***Significance
at the 1% level
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The Hausman-McFadden test is easy to understand and execute, but it has signifi-
cant drawbacks. The most obvious is that there is no formal procedure for determining
which countries should be excluded to create the subset IS for the optimal test. This is
especially troubling since the value of the test statistic varies widely depending on which
countries are removed to create the set IS . This test also has well-documented technical
drawbacks when I > 3. In particular, the matrix Σˆ may not be positive definite and
the computed value of the test statistic may even be negative.
To explore the robustness of my results I ran the test on every possible subset of
I−3 countries. Of the 10,660 total tests generated by this process, just over half yielded
positive values of the test statistic. Of the 5,397 remaining tests, only seven fail to reject
the null hypothesis of IIA. I include the results of the test on the subset of countries
that excludes France, Germany and Poland under Test 3 in the final column of Table
2.2.
2.5 Test Two: McFadden and Train
McFadden and Train (2000)[21] describe an alternative test of the IIA assumption that
can be used to evaluate whether the CES import demand system applies to agricultural
trade. The idea behind this test is that if all heterogeneity in price offers is independently
distributed, market shares should be uncorrelated across exporters and deviations from
average trade costs will not have a statistically significant impact on bilateral market
share. The formal hypothesis of the test is that equation 2.4 adequately describes
market share in the data, against the alternative that comparative advantage is not
independently distributed across products.
To conduct the test, results from estimating 2.6 are used to calculate predicted
bilateral market shares:
pˆiAni =
exp{SˆAi − θ(bˆAni + lˆAni +
6∑
r=1
dˆr
A
ni + eˆx
A
i + EˆU
A
ni +
ˆNAFTA
A
ni)}
I∑
l=1
exp{SˆAl − θ(bˆAnl + lˆAnl +
6∑
r=1
dˆr
A
nl + eˆx
A
l + EˆU
A
nl + ˆNAFTA
A
nl)}
These estimates are then used to construct artificial variables from trade costs, which
take the form:
zni =
1
2
(tni − tn)2
24
where tn =
I∑
l=1
tnlpˆi
A
nl and tni is a trade cost proxy variable. McFadden and Train
show that if the coefficients on these artificial variables are jointly insignificant, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected.
I calculate artificial variables for the trade cost proxy variables border, language,
distance and RTA and then estimate:
ln
(
piAni
piAnn
)
= SAi −SAn−θ(bAni+lAni+
6∑
r=1
dArni+ex
A
i +EU
A
ni+NAFTA
A
ni+ξ
A
ni)+
10∑
d=1
(znid−znnd)βd
where znid is the artificial variable constructed from the d
th element of the vector of
trade cost proxy variables for exporter i in market n and βd is a coefficient. Regression
results are reported in Table 2.3.
2.6 Conclusion
The assumption, maintained in the standard EK framework, that the sole source of
product-specific comparative advantage is independently-distributed technological pro-
ductivity differences has strong implications for trade elasticities. Importantly, these
elasticities are counter-intuitive as a description of how bilateral agricultural trade re-
sponds to changes in trade costs. Tests based on the gravity-like equation that describes
the pattern of product-specific comparative advantage in the EK model convincingly
reject the CES import demand system as a representation of trade elasticities in the
agricultural sector. In the next chapter I modify the EK assumptions that yield equation
2.7 to allow for a more flexible structure of elasticities.
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Table 2.3: McFadden and Train Test Results
Null Hypothesis: Artificial variables are jointly = 0
Test Statistic: F = 2.01, p-value = 0.0286
Selected Variables EK Model Test Model
Border 0.75* -1.97
Language 1.49*** -2.85
EU -2.62*** -6.28**
NAFTA -1.64 -2.29
Distance 1 -5.89*** -11.01**
Distance 2 -8.47*** -17.45**
Distance 3 -10.27*** -21.22
Distance 4 -11.87*** -143.19***
Distance 5 -13.91*** -29.51*
Distance 6 -15.00*** -24.56
Artificial Variables
Z Border 5.91
Z Language 9.33**
Z EU 8.09
Z NAFTA 2.72
Z Distance 1 12.07
Z Distance 2 18.67
Z Distance 3 22.1
Z Distance 4 263.45***
Z Distance 5 31.43
Z Distance 6 19.14
Chapter 3
A New Way to Model Product
Heterogeneity
In Chapter 2 I performed tests which found that the CES import demand system implied
by the EK assumptions on technology and trade costs is inconsistent with agricultural
trade data. In this chapter I make two modifications to the EK framework. First, I
introduce a product-specific term into each country’s agricultural production technology
that captures how well an exporter’s agro-ecological characteristics suit an individual
product. This term induces correlation in comparative advantage among countries with
similar agro-ecological characteristics and generates cross-country elasticities that are
increasing in this correlation. Second, I allow trade costs to vary deterministically across
products. In this way, cross-country correlation is further increasing in “gravity”.
Next, I derive a structural relationship between bilateral trade flows and trade costs
corresponding to the gravity-like Equation 2.6 under these modifications. The resulting
equation is specified as a random coefficients logit model. The density of productiv-
ity and trade costs across products is captured in the econometric model by interac-
tions between variables representing exporter characteristics and variables representing
product-specific production requirements and trade costs. The model is used to estimate
trade costs and the parameters of the agricultural productivity distribution. These are
the key parameters describing trade patterns in the general equilibrium model, which I
will introduce in Chapter 4.
26
27
My estimation methodology draws heavily on techniques pioneered in the discrete
choice literature, particularly those of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)[7] (BLP).
Their approach allows the data to identify which countries are likely to be closest substi-
tutes rather than forcing the researcher to do so a priori via carefully-defined sub-sectors
as discussed in Chapter 1. It also opens the door to evaluate the effect of the dispersion
of tariffs and other trade-distorting policies across products within the agricultural sec-
tor on the patterns of global production and trade. This is a singular contribution in
itself. I estimate a more complex model of product-level comparative advantage using
the same sector-level bilateral market shares I used in the EK-style model in Chapter 2
as the dependent variable.
3.1 Two Modifications of the EK Assumptions
To capture the role of agro-ecological endowments in shaping specialization patterns
within the agricultural sector, I modify the agriculture sector technology by allowing
land productivity to vary across products:
qAi (j) = z
A
i (j)(N
βAi
i (ai(j)Li)
1−βAi )α
A
i QA
1−αAi
i (3.1)
This technology is identical to Equation 3.1 with the exception of ai(j), which represents
the productivity of exporter i land in product j production.1 I assume ai(j) follows a
parametric density that is a deterministic function of exporter i’s agro-ecological charac-
teristics and product j’s agro-ecological production requirements. The value ai(j) thus
reflects the suitability of exporter i’s natural environment for product j production. For
example, countries with volcanic soil and tropical climate will tend to have higher values
of ai(j) for pineapple, which thrives in volcanic soil and tropical climate. Importantly,
countries with similar agro-ecological characteristics will have high values of ai(j) for a
similar set of products. This term thus captures the tendency for countries with similar
agro-ecological attributes have comparative advantage in a similar set of agricultural
products.
I maintain the EK assumption that zAi (j) is a random variable representing tech-
nological productivity arising from exporter i’s R&D process, and that it follows an
1 This is like the human-capital-adjusted labor used throughout the economics literature.
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independent, Frechet distribution. I further assume it is independent of ai(j). This
means an exporter is equally likely to have a high realization of zAi (j) in a product for
which its agro-ecological environment is unsuitable as it is for a product it is well-suited
to produce.
Cost-minimizing producers of product j in exporter i have unit production costs:
CAi (j) =
a˜i(j)c
A
i
zAi (j)
where a˜i(j) = ai(j)
−αAi (1−βAi ). As in EK, exporters face iceberg trade costs when selling
product j in import market n. Unlike EK, I allow these costs to vary across products,
following a parametric density that is a deterministic function of product-specific policies
and marketing requirements. I assume τAni(j) is independent of both ai(j) and z
A
i (j)
and I maintain the assumptions that τAni(j) ≤ τAnk(j)τAki(j) and τAnn(j) = 1.
With perfect competition, the price offered by exporter i in market n for agricultural
product j is:
pAni(j) =
a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j)
zAi (j)
(3.2)
As in EK, buyers in market n purchase each product from the source country that
offers the lowest price. In contrast to the EK framework where technology is the only
source of heterogeneity, high realizations of zAi (j) may not translate into comparative
advantage in market n if exporter i’s environment is unsuitable for product j or if τAni(j)
is particularly high. For example, the Canadian R&D process may indeed deliver a high-
productivity technology for cultivating coffee beans, but without the appropriate climate
and terrain, Canada is still unlikely to be a competitive coffee exporter. Similarly,
without high import tariffs specific to sugar, tropical countries might be revealed to
have comparative advantage in exporting sugar to US and European markets.
As in the EK model, exporter i’s share of market n agricultural products expenditure
is equivalent to the probability it offers the lowest price for an agricultural product in
market n.2 To arrive at an expression that corresponds to Equation 2.4, first note that
2 I show this formally in Appendix D.4.
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the probability exporter i offers the lowest price for product j in market n is:3
Pr(pAni(j) ≤ pAnl(j) ∀l) = piAni(j) =
TAi
(
a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j)
)−θ
I∑
l=1
T kl (a˜l(j)c
A
l τ
A
nl(j))
−θ
(3.3)
This product-specific probability is a function of the global distribution of land produc-
tivity and trade costs for product j. Exporter i’s total share of market n agricultural
expenditure is the unconditional probability it offers the lowest price for any agricultural
product. Since land productivity and trade costs are independently distributed, this is:
piAni =
∫
T ki (a˜ic
A
i τ
A
ni)
−θ
I∑
l=1
T kl (a˜lc
A
l τ
A
nl)
−θ
dFa˜n(a˜)dFτn(τ ) (3.4)
where dFa˜n(a˜)dFτn(τ) is the joint density of a˜ = [a˜(0) . . . a˜(1)] and τ
A
n =
[
τAn (0), . . . , τ
A
n (1)
]
4
across products consumed in market n.
Equation 3.4 corresponds to Equation 2.4 and will likewise serve as the model from
which I estimate trade costs and productivity parameters. Unlike Frechet-distributed
technological productivity, the integral over land productivity and trade costs has no
analytical solution. And unlike Equation 2.4, this expression cannot be log-linearized.
However, dFa˜n(a˜)dFτn(τ ) is a parametric density for which I can specify Equation 3.4
to estimate parameters. Before I specify the model of bilateral trade flows based on
3.4 and describe the estimation procedure, I first highlight a few implications of the
modified model.
First, while the mechanism generating trade in this model is Ricardian in the sense
that differences in productivity generate comparative advantage, it also has elements
of endowment-based trade. The model predicts, for example, that countries that are
“tropical-climate-abundant” will tend to specialize in agricultural products that are
“tropical-climate-intensive” because they will tend to have high values of ai(j) for trop-
ical products. However, this does not produce complete specialization in a bilateral
relationship at the sector-level or even within a sub-sector defined by production re-
quirements. Ricardian differences in technological productivity defined by realizations
of zAi (j) and even small differences in values of ai(j) can create comparative advantage
3 I derive this expression in Appendix D.2.
4 a˜(j) = [a˜1(j), . . . , a˜I(j)], τ
A
n (j) =
[
τAn1(j), . . . , τ
A
nI(j)
]
30
and thus incentives for agricultural trade even between two countries that are both
tropical-land-abundant.
Second, in my model the force of comparative advantage is product-specific. As
I discussed in Chapter 1, the force of comparative advantage is determined by the
variation in price offers across countries. In the EK model this variation is entirely
captured by θ. However, as I argued elsewhere, a single, constant measure of the force
that comparative advantage exerts over bilateral trade barriers cannot be expected to
fully capture the competitive intensity faced by agricultural producers.
In the modified model, deterministic differences in agro-ecological endowments ai(j),
and trade costs also create variation in price offers. As an example, products like some
tropical fruits or spices have very specialized production requirements. As such, there
may be fewer countries in which these products can be competitively produced. This is
characterized by extreme values of ai(j). The resulting variation in price offers across
exporters will be greater for these products than for e.g., soybeans which can be pro-
duced under many different agro-ecological conditions. Similarly, extreme realizations
of τAni(j), for example a geographical indication recognized by trading partners, may
also increase the variation in price offers across countries.
As a final note, a wide range of values and calibration methods have been proposed
for the parameter θ (see Simonovska and Waugh (2011)[6]). As such, it is arguably an
additional advantage of the modified model that the measurement of the effects of lower
bilateral trade costs is less reliant on this parameter.
3.2 Elasticity in the Modified Model
The elasticity of exporter i’s share of market n agricultural expenditure with respect to
competitor l’s trade costs in the modified model is:
∂piAni
∂τAnl
τAnl
piAni
=

−θ
piAni
∫
pini
A(j)(1− piAni(j))dFa˜(a˜)dFτn(τ ) if l = i
θ
piAni
∫
piAni(j)pi
A
nl(j)dFa˜(a˜)dFτn(τ ) otherwise
(3.5)
In contrast to the CES import demand system described by Equation 2.7, elasticity
with respect to a given exporter’s trade costs varies across competitors. Sensitivity to
changes in a competitor’s trade costs is product-specific: The probability Ecuador offers
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the lowest price for bananas in the US market may be highly sensitive to changes in
Costa Rican trade costs, whereas the probability it offers the lowest price for oranges
may be less so. Sector-level elasticity is a weighted average of product-specific sensi-
tivities, where the weights are based on each product’s share of market n agricultural
expenditure.
The modified model is consistent with a key fact of trade liberalization highlighted
in Kehoe and Ruhl (2013)[13]. Namely, that the products that are the least-traded
between two countries tend to realize the biggest increase in their share of exports after
bilateral liberalization. To see this, note from Equation 3.3 that the elasticity of piAni(j)
with respect to τAni(j) is θ(1− piAni(j)), which is decreasing in market share. This means
that when τAni(j) declines, the direct effect on the probability of offering the lowest price
is largest for products with the smallest probability prior to liberalization.
Unlike in the CES import demand system, own-country trade elasticity is not de-
termined solely by market share. Own-country trade elasticity from Equation 3.5 can
be written:
∂piAni
∂τAni
τAni
piAni
= −θ((1− piAni)−
1
piAni
var(piAni(j))) (3.6)
The magnitude of own-country elasticity is decreasing in the extent to which the proba-
bility its producers offer the lowest price varies across products. In the previous chapter
I argued that the intensity of international price competition varies across products in
systematic and non-trivial ways using the illustration of the dominance of Coˆte d’Ivoire
producers in global cocoa trade. In the EK framework, an exporter is equally likely
to offer the lowest price in any given agricultural product, so var(piAni(j)) = 0 and the
relative magnitude of the direct effect of a change in bilateral trade costs is determined
only by piAni.
In the modified model, on the other hand, var(piAni(j)) also depends on variation
in the suitability of its agro-ecological characteristics ai(j) and trade costs τ
A
ni(j). Ex-
porters with extreme values of ai(j) or τ
A
ni(j) for some products will tend to have a
larger var(pikni(j)) in any market that imports these products. Thus we expect the
direct effect of lowering bilateral agricultural tariffs to be smaller for exporters that
specialize in products for which competition outside of its borders is not intense or for
which non-tariff trade costs remain high. This is consistent with basic micro-economic
theory.
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The modified model also induces variation in cross-country elasticity that is stifled
under the CES import demand system. Cross-country elasticity captures the indirect
effect of a change in τAni across exporter i’s competitors. Country i’s partial equilibrium
cross-country elasticity with respect to exporter l in market n from Equation 3.5 can
be written:
∂piAni
∂τAnl
τAnl
piAni
=
θ
piAni
(cov(piAni(j), pi
A
nl(j)) + pi
A
ni × piAnl) l 6= i (3.7)
In the EK framework - and all other models with a CES import demand system - all
countries are perfect substitutes so cov(piAni(j), pi
A
nl(j)) = 1. The cross-country elasticity
is identical for all competitors and the magnitude is primarily determined by θ. In
contrast, in the modified model cross-country elasticity is larger for country pairs with
large cov(piAni(j), pi
A
nl(j)). Such countries are more likely to be competing head-to-head
in the same products. I refer to these countries as close substitutes.
Since zAi (j) is independently distributed across products, covariance in pi
A
ni(j) comes
entirely from ai(j) and τ
A
ni(j). Costa Rica’s probability of offering the lowest price for
product j in the US market, piAUSA,CRI(j), will tend to co-vary more strongly with that of
Ecuador than The Netherlands since Ecuador is more agro-ecologically similar to Costa
Rica. On the other hand, an East African country may be just as similar to Costa
Rica as Ecuador in terms of its agro-ecological endowment, but its market share will
nevertheless be less sensitive because of larger costs of exporting to the United States.
3.3 Specification
In this section I specify Equation 3.4 as a random coefficients logit model. The primary
distinction between my approach and the simple log-linear model delivered by the EK
framework is that I estimate parameters that describe the distribution of production and
trade costs across products, whereas the EK approach essentially estimates a degenerate
distribution for these costs. Since the focus of this work is on introducing the random
coefficients methodology rather than on its application to a particular policy issue, I keep
the specification as simple as possible. Future applications will take a more methodical
approach.
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I begin by defining
SAi ≡ ln(TAi )− θln(cAi ) (3.8)
as in EK. Next I specify land productivity, a˜i(j) as a parametric function of exporter
agro-ecological characteristics and product-specific agro-ecological requirements:
ln(a˜i(j)) = Xiδ + Xi(E(j)Λ)
′
+ Xi(νE(j)ΣE)
′ (3.9)
where Xi is a 1× k vector of variables describing country i’s agro-ecological character-
istics; δ is a k × 1 vector of coefficients; E(j) is a 1 × m vector of product j-specific
agro-ecological production requirements that can be observed and quantified; Λ is an
m× k matrix of coefficients that describe how the relationship between elements of Xi
and land productivity varies across products; νE(j) is a 1× k vector that captures un-
observable product j-specific agro-ecological requirements; and ΣE is a scaling matrix
that allows the effect of unobservable requirements to vary across elements of Xi.
I define Xi =
[
ALi tropi tempi bori
]
, where ALi is log arable land area, and
the remaining elements are the shares of total land area in tropical, temperate, and
boreal climate zones. I normalize the climate share variables so their coefficients sum
to zero[22]. Defining product-specific production requirements is less straightforward.
While I refer to E(j) as “observable” production requirements I cannot actually observe
them. Fortunately, the BLP methodology only requires information on the distribution
of these requirements across agricultural products, which I obtain implicitly from the
distribution of production across countries as follows.
I define E(j) =
[
trop(j) temp(j) bor(j)
]
, where elements of E(j) are the inten-
sity of product j’s cultivation in each climate zone. This vector represents the ideal
climate for product j. I refer to e.g., trop(j) as the tropical land intensity of product
j production. I assume E(j) is distributed across products following the empirical dis-
tribution of product requirements for products defined at the “item” level by the FAO,
which is the most disaggregated agricultural production data available to me. I assume
unobservable agro-ecological requirements νE(j), follow a standard multivariate normal
distribution.
I specify product-specific trade costs as:
ln(τAni(j)) = tniβ + ex
A
i + tni(νtn(j)Σt)
′ + ξAni (3.10)
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where tni is the 1×10 vector of proxy variables for trade costs used in Chapter 2;5 β is
a vector of coefficients on those proxy variables; exAi is an exporter-specific trade cost;
νtn(j) is a 1× 10 vector of standard normal random variables representing unobserved
product-specific trade costs in import market n; Σt is a scaling matrix; and ξ
A
ni captures
unobservable or unquantifiable bilateral trade costs that are invariant across products
and orthogonal to the regressors.
Note that variables from data on product-specific trade policies could be included
here in a matrix that interacts with elements of tni in the same way that E(j) inter-
acts with Xi in the land productivity distribution specification. This could include
product-specific tariff data or other measures of agricultural protection disaggregated
across products at any level. It can also include other policies, such as product-specific
agricultural price supports, that either increase or decrease unit production costs. The
framework I present here can thus be used to conduct studies similar to the highly
influential Armington-based CGE models used to evaluate various proposals for multi-
lateral trade reform in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations in Anderson and Martin
(2006)[23], Hertel and Winters (2005)[24], Boue¨t, Mevel, and Orden (2006)[25] and
many others.
Using Equations 3.9 and 3.10 in 3.4 I get the modified model of trade flows, which
corresponds to Equation 2.6:
piAni = (3.11)∫ exp{S˜Ai +Xi(E(j)Λ)′+Xi(νE(j)ΣE)′−θtniβ−θexi−θtni(νtn (j)Σt)′}
I∑
l=1
exp{S˜Al +Xl(E(j)Λ)′+Xl(νE(j)ΣE)′−θtnlβ−θexl−θtnl(νtn (j)Σt)′
dFˆEn(E)dFˆνn(ν)
where S˜Ai ≡ SAi + Xiδ and dFˆEn(E)dFˆνn(ν) is the estimated density of products im-
ported into market n defined jointly by their climate and unobserved agro-ecological
requirements and trade costs. Since the integral in 3.11 does not have an analytical
solution, simulation techniques are required to estimate the parameters.
Before I discuss the estimation procedure, I first demonstrate how this specification
generates more sensible predictions for the response of trade and production patterns to
policy change. Recall from Equation 3.7 that cross-country trade elasticity is increasing
in the covariance of piAni(j). To illustrate how this specification generates covariance
5 These are dummy variables indicating that the countries share a border or language, their distance,
and whether they are members of the EU or NAFTA FTAs.
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among similar exporters, I separate the terms in Equation 3.3 into those that are in-
variant across products, denoted δAni, and those that vary, denoted µ
A
ni(j):
δAni ≡ SAi + Xiδ − θtniβ − θexAi and
µAni(j) ≡ Xi(E(j)Λ)′ + Xi(νE(j)ΣE)′ − θtni(νtn(j)Σt)′
The probability country i offers the lowest price for product j can then be written in
these terms:
piAni(j) =
δAni + µ
A
ni(j)
I∑
l=1
δAnl + µ
A
nl(j)
and the covariance between the price offers of exporter i and exporter l in market n is:
cov(µAni(j), µ
A
nl(j)) =
∑
k,q
∑
m,p
λkmλqpXi,kXl,qcov(Em(j),Ep(j)) (3.12)
+
∑
k
σ2kXi,kXl,k +
∑
d
σ2t,dtni,dtnl,d
The first two sums describe covariance arising from the degree to which the exporters
are agro-ecologically well-suited for producing similar agricultural products. The last
captures covariance due to “gravity.” The parameter values Λ, ΣE and Σt are weights
defining the influence of each term on covariance.
3.4 Estimation
I estimate equation 3.11 using the simulated method of moments approach introduced
by BLP and detailed in Nevo (2000)[26] and Train (2009)[27]. To numerically evaluate
the integral, I use the “smooth simulator” suggested by Nevo (2000):
piAni =
1
ns
ns∑
j=1
exp{S˜Ai + Xi(E(j)Λ)′ + Xi(νE(j)ΣE)′ − θtniβ − θexi − θtni(νtn(j)Σt)′
I∑
l=1
exp{S˜Al + Xl(E(j)Λ)′ + Xl(νE(j)ΣE)′ − θtnlβ − θexl − θtnl(νtn(j)Σt)′
(3.13)
where ns is a large number. The general approach of the BLP method is to compute
the probability of offering the lowest price at the product-level piAni(j) for a given set
of parameter values and then aggregate over all products purchased in a given import
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market to obtain the predicted sector-level market share. Parameters values are chosen
to minimize the difference between observed and expected sector-level market share.6
I use the minimum distance procedure suggested by Nevo (2000)[26] to obtain δˆ
from ˆ˜SAi . By definition:
S˜Ai = Xiδ + S
A
i
Estimates of δ and SAi are then obtained from:
δˆ = (X′V−1X)−1X′V−1
ˆ˜A
S
where V is the covariance matrix of the S˜Ai estimates and estimates of S
A
i are obtained
as the residuals from this estimation.
Data
In addition to the market shares and trade cost proxy variables I assembled to estimate
Equation 2.6 in Chapter 2, estimating 3.11 requires data on exporter characteristics
Xi, the distribution of product-specific climate requirements E(j) across products, and
the density of agricultural products imported by each country. I obtain data on the
distribution of each country’s total land area across climate zones
[
tropi tempi bori
]
from the GTAP Land Use Database [28] and data on total arable land (ALi) from the
World Bank World Development Indicators [16].
The vector of observable production requirements E(j) =
[
trop(j) temp(j) boreal(j)
]
]
is estimated for products at the FAO item level as a production-weighted distribution of
climate across all 42 countries. For example the tropical cultivation intensity for FAO
item j is estimated as:
trop(j) =
I∑
i=1
ωi(j)tropi
where ωi(j) is country i’s share of global item j production value. The estimate of E(j)
for each of the 130 FAO agricultural items traded among the countries in my data set
is listed in Appendix E.
I use FAO item level import data to estimate FˆEn(E), the empirical distribution of
E(j) across products imported by each market.7 To do so I first compile a list of 100
6 The process could be improved by using additional moments such as sub-sector-level market shares
as well.
7 See Appendix E.
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products imported by each market and defined by E(j). Unique values of E(j) are in-
cluded in this list in proportion to their share of the item they represent in total imports.
That is, if 15% of importer n’s total agricultural imports are of the FAO item “wheat”,
then E(wheat) makes up 15 entries the list that represents FˆEn(E). The distribution
FˆEn(E)Fˆνn(ν) is completed by associating each product with the corresponding value
of νn(j) = [νE(j) νtn(j)] drawn from a standard multivariate normal distribution for
each item. I draw ns = 100 values of (E(j), νn(j)) at random from these distributions
effectively generating a “data set” of 100 products imported by each market.
Results: Production Cost Parameters
In this section I will first present the parameter estimates that describe the distribution
of production costs across agricultural products. I will briefly discuss their interpretation
and present a few key implications for the structure of competition in the agricultural
sector before moving on to trade cost estimates. Recall that unit production costs are
specified as follows.
ln(CAi (j)) = S
A
i + Xi ×
[
δ + (E(j)Λ)′ + (νE(j)ΣE)′
]
(3.14)
This exposition underscores that differences in production requirements [E(j) νE(j)]
generate variation in the effect of exporter agro-ecological characteristics Xi, on pro-
duction costs. Table 3.1 contains the parameter estimates that describe this variation,
i.e., δˆ,8 Λˆ, and ΣˆE .
Coefficients on all climate variables are normalized to sum to zero. As such, effects
of exporter climate characteristics are interpreted with respect to the “average” climate
and the effects of product-specific climate requirements are interpreted with respect to
the “average” production requirement. The average climate distribution in my sample
is 23% tropical, 64% temperate and 13% boreal. The average distribution of cultivation
across climates for products in my sample is 10% tropical, 80% temperate and 10%
boreal.
As an example of how to interpret the coefficient estimates in Table 3.1, consider
the effect of an exporter’s share of land in a tropical climate zone (tropi). The negative
8 These coefficients are estimated by regressing values of ˆ˜SAi obtained from Equation 3.11 on Xi as
suggested in Nevo (2000)[26].
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Table 3.1: Production Cost Distribution Parameter Estimates
Exporter Mean Climate Requirements (Λ) Unobserved
Characteristics Effect (δ) Tropical Temperate Requirements (ΣE)
ln Arable -0.07*** -1.14*** -1.23*** 0.04***
Land (ALi) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.004)
Tropical Climate -2.64*** 4.12*** 7.93*** -0.03
Share (tropi) (0.12) (0.35) (0.29) (0.1)
Temperate Climate 1.61*** -0.03 -4.02*** 0.19**
Share (tempi) (0.12) (0.33) (0.28) (0.1)
Boreal Climate 1.03*** -4.09*** -3.92*** -0.16
Share (bori) (0.19) (0.46) (0.41) (0.17)
mean coefficient estimate on the share of tropical land indicates that market share in
the average product is decreasing in the extent to which an exporter has a larger-than-
average share of tropical land. However, the large and positive estimates of λtrop,trop =
4.12 and λtrop,temp = 7.93 imply that this disadvantage is reversed for products that
are more intensively tropical or temperate than the average product. It might seem
odd that the value of tropical land share increases more with the temperate intensity of
production than the tropical intensity of production, but this is in part a reflection of
the temperate climate intensity of the average product. The statistically insignificant
estimate for σtrop suggests that the climate-based differences in production requirements
defined here adequately capture the variation in the effect of tropical land share across
products.
The left panel of Figure 3.1 displays the distribution of the total effect of tropical
climate share: δtrop + E(j)λtrop + ν(j)σtrop across the 130 traded items. The figure
illustrates that the total effect is positive for a large number of products even though
the mean effect is negative. In contrast to the effect of tropical land, a larger than
average share of boreal climate increases market share in the average product, but
the benefit is severely diminishing in both tropical and temperate climate cultivation
intensity. The right panel of Figure 3.1 illustrates the distribution of the total value of
the boreal coefficient: δbor + E(j)λbor + ν(j)σbor, across all 130 traded items. Despite
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the positive mean effect, the coefficient on boreal land share is negative for all but a few
products. 
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Climate Effects Across Products
The only climate share characteristic for which unobserved heterogeneity is statis-
tically significant is tempi. This suggests that the distribution of production require-
ments across three climate zones is inadequate to explain how the value of temperate
land share varies across products. This is unsurprising given that the average country
is characterized by a large share of temperate land and the average product is inten-
sively cultivated in temperate climate zones. A more precise measure of the relationship
between exporter agro-ecological characteristics and trade patterns will thus require ei-
ther additional refinements to the temperate land characteristic or additional variables
representing non-climate production requirements that influence the differential value
of temperate land across products. This will be particularly important in applications
where trade between countries with a large share of temperate land is central to the
analysis.
In Figure 3.2, I demonstrate that the modified model predicts exporters will special-
ize in products for which their agro-ecological characteristics are well-suited. This is in
contrast to the EK model, where specialization is randomly determined by realizations
of zAi (j). Figure 3.3 is a relative frequency distribution of S˜
A
i + Xi(ΛE(j)) for i=Costa
Rica, The United States, and Turkey for j= coffee, tea and spice products. This value
can be interpreted as a measure of the country’s absolute advantage in product j. Values
of “competitiveness” closer to zero indicate greater absolute advantage.
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Figure 3.2: “Competitiveness” in Coffee, Tea and Spices
Estimates of S˜Ai suggest that the United States and Turkey both have an absolute
advantage over Costa Rica in the average agricultural product.9 However, Figure 3.3
illustrates the model’s prediction that Costa Rica is more competitive than the United
States in all coffee, tea and spice products, and more competitive than Turkey in most
of them. I list the values of ˆ˜SAi obtained from Equation 3.11 in Appendix B. Recall that
these values are interpreted as the competitiveness in the average product compared to
the average country.
Results: Trade Costs
Table 3.2 contains parameter estimates for the distribution of trade costs across agricul-
tural products. Coefficients in the first column capture the average effect of each trade
cost component on market share. Positive coefficients imply the effect decreases trade
costs, but increases market share. The second column contains coefficient estimates on
the product-specific heterogeneity around each trade cost component, Σt. These values
can be interpreted like a standard deviation of the distribution of each effect across
9 ˆ˜SATUR = 4.30,
ˆ˜SAUSA = 2.38,
ˆ˜SACRI = −6.27
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products.
The third column of Table 3.2 contains coefficient estimates from the model I esti-
mated in Chapter 2. Notice that the mean effect estimates from the modified model are
broadly similar in magnitude to the EK estimates, and all have the same sign.
It is perhaps surprising that the signs on NAFTA and EU are negative in both
models, implying that membership in these FTAs increases agricultural trade costs on
average. This result can be rationalized by the product-specific interpretation of trade
cost effects in the modified model. Indeed, there are many agricultural products for
which no member country of EU or NAFTA will be agro-ecologically well-suited: The
lowest price offer for green coffee beans in France certainly has a very low probability
of coming from producers in another EU member state!
Importantly, the large magnitude of σˆNAFTA and σˆEU indicates a great deal of
variation in the effect of membership in these FTAs across products. This suggests
additional variables describing product-specific policies or other product-specific costs
are needed to more precisely describe the distribution of the effects of NAFTA and EU
membership. This can be accomplished by introducing interaction terms between tni
and observable product-specific trade costs such as tariff rates just like the interaction
between Xi and E(j) in the productivity distribution.
A notable departure from the EK model is that the mean effect of distance among
countries in closest proximity to each other is larger than the mean effect of the second-
closest distance category. However, the large and statistically significant value of σD1 =
−3.26 suggests that the total effect of distance in this category varies considerably
across products and is likely to have a smaller effect on trade costs than distance in the
second category for many products. As with the RTA variables, this suggests additional
information on product-specific trade costs should be incorporated for more precise
predictions of the effect of distance on trade among neighboring countries.
I report estimates of the exporter-specific trade cost exAi , in Appendix C. Recall
that these values are interpreted with respect to the average country: Exporters with
coefficients greater than one face higher than average agricultural trade costs and vice
versa. Coefficient estimates from the modified model are highly correlated with and of
broadly similar magnitude to those obtained under the EK framework in Chapter 2. As
in the EK-style model of manufacturing trade in Waugh (2010)[15], exporter-specific
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Table 3.2: Trade Cost Distribution Parameters
Modified Model
Exporter Unobserved EK Model
Characteristic Mean (β) Heterogeneity (σt) Coefficient
Common Border 0.54* 0.93*** 0.75*
(-0.35) (-0.33) (-0.56)
Common Language 1.30** -0.48** 1.49***
(-0.29) (-0.21) (-0.35)
Distance 1 -8.82*** -3.26*** -5.89***
(-0.21) (-0.29) (-0.7)
Distance 2 -7.75*** -0.78*** -8.47***
(-0.34) (-0.26) (-0.44)
Distance 3 -9.57*** 0.6*** -10.27***
(-0.31) (-0.24) (-0.32)
Distance 4 -11.33*** 0.63*** -11.87***
(-0.32) (-0.2) (-0.32)
Distance 5 -14.09*** -1.14*** -13.91***
(-0.32) (-0.33) (-0.18)
Distance 6 -14.38*** 0.1 -15.00***
(-0.23) (-0.34) (-0.17)
Intra-EU -5.68*** -2.76*** -2.62***
(-0.19) (-0.2) (-0.47)
Intra-NAFTA -14.92*** -8.21*** -1.64***
(-0.28) (-0.58) (-1.63)
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trade costs tend to be higher for developing countries. However, it is notable that the
highest exporter-specific costs in agriculture are associated with former members of the
Soviet Union and Communist Bloc.
3.5 Partial Equilibrium Elasticity Estimates
I calculate trade elasticities by simulating the integral in Equation 3.5 using the same
ns individual products I used to estimate the model. For example, the elasticity of
substitution of exporter i with respect to exporter l in market n is computed:
∂pˆiAni
∂τˆAnl
∂τˆAnl
∂pˆiAni
=
θ
pˆikni
 1
ns
ns∑
j=1
pˆikni(j)pˆi
k
nl(j)
 (3.15)
using the coefficient estimates above to calculate pˆikni(j) and pˆi
A
ni.
10
Unlike under the CES import demand system implied by the EK framework, cross-
country elasticity with respect to each exporter varies significantly across competitors
in each import market. A measure of the extent of this variation is the ratio of the
maximum to the minimum value of Equation 3.15 with respect to each exporter’s trade
costs. Since the value of this max-min ratio is exactly one in the EK model, the extent
to which it exceeds one is a measure of the additional variation across competitors
detected by the modified model. The max-min ratio for any exporter will naturally vary
across import markets due to differences in bilateral trade costs and the composition of
imported products. I report the median value across import markets for each exporter
in Table 3.3. The modified model predicts over 17-times more variation in sensitivity to
US trade costs in the median market! Even for Chile, which displays the least variation
in elasticity, the modified model delivers more than twice the variation as the EK model.
These results confirm that the modified model will generate more nuanced predic-
tions for the effect of changes in trade costs on bilateral trade patterns than the EK
model. However, the model should also predict sensible directions for shifts in bilateral
trade flows. The relative magnitudes of indirect effects are described by the pattern
of cross-country elasticities across competitors. Recall from Equation 3.7 that these
elasticities are increasing in the covariance generated by similarity in agro-ecological
characteristics and trade costs.
10 I set θ = 4.12, the benchmark estimate from Simonvska and Waugh (2011).[6]
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Table 3.3: Increase in Cross-Country Elasticity Variation from Modified over EK Model
Median over import markets
Exporter Maximum Elasticity/
Minimum Elasticity
Exporter Maximum Elasticity/
Minimum Elasticity
USA 17.22 Uruguay 8.28
France 16.01 Austria 7.43
Colombia 14.78 Ecuador 7.16
Russia 14.27 Poland 6.98
Argentina 13.87 Netherlands 6.9
Germany 13.77 Canada 6.6
Sweden 12.47 Denmark 6.37
UK 12.44 Finland 5.65
Costa Rica 12.14 Romania 4.94
Czech Republic 12.1 South Africa 4.57
Malaysia 11.64 Turkey 4.4
Thailand 10.97 India 4.27
Slovenia 10.62 Estonia 4.18
Portugal 10.55 Israel 3.65
Italy 10.53 Slovakia 3.3
Spain 10.07 Iran 3.15
Kenya 9.73 New Zealand 2.91
Hungary 9.43 Mexico 2.89
Indonesia 8.81 Japan 2.66
Brazil 8.76 Australia 2.41
Ireland 8.66 Chile 2.18
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As an informal test of the model’s strength in identifying close substitutes, recall
the EK model’s prediction that Ecuador and The Netherlands will have an identical
response to a change in Costa Rican trade costs in the US market. Table 3.4 displays US
market share elasticities with respect to Costa Rican trade costs in the modified model
relative to those predicted by the EK framework in Chapter 2 for Ecuador and The
Netherlands, as well as for their competitors with the largest and smallest elasticities.
First, the modified model predicts Ecuador is more than twice as sensitive to changes
in Costa Rican trade costs as The Netherlands. Second, notice that relative elasticities
reported in Table 3.4 are all greater than one. This suggests that the EK approach
under-predicts the size of the trade response to changes in Costa Rican trade costs for
all of its competitors in the US market.
Table 3.4: Elasticity of US Market Share with respect to Costa Rican Trade Costs
Modified model predictions relative to EK predictions
Exporter
Modified Model Elasticity/
EK Elasticity
Colombia 14.15
Ecuador 7.00
The Netherlands 3.65
Russia 2.06
I explore the model’s predictions more broadly in Table 3.5, which is a matrix of the
elasticities predicted by the modified model relative to those predicted by the framework
in Chapter 2 for selected countries. Since relative elasticities vary across import markets,
I report the median value. Each row contains an exporter’s elasticity of market share
with respect to the competitor in the column’s trade costs in the median market.
Relative cross-country elasticity ranges from 0.85 for Costa Rica’s median relative
elasticity with respect to Canadian trade costs to 30.78 for Italy’s median relative elas-
ticity with respect to Spain. This is sensible: One expects Costa Rica to be relatively
unaffected by Canadian trade costs, whereas Italy and Spain are likely to be close sub-
stitutes in many markets. This result also means that the EK model would tend to
drastically under-predict the response of Italy’s trade flows to changes in Spain’s trade
costs The modified model predicts Italian market share is nearly 40-times more elastic
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to Spanish trade costs than the EK-style model from Chapter 2! Similarly, the EK
model over-predicts changes in Costa Rican trade flows in response to Canadian trade
costs. Elasticity estimates from the modified model suggest that the EK model under-
predicts the magnitude of the response to changes in trade costs for just under one-third
(31%) of all bilateral trade flows.
While the pattern of cross-country elasticity says a lot about how the model func-
tions, the magnitude of the direct effect is typically the primary object of interest for
policy-makers. The direct effect is defined by own-country trade costs elasticities. Table
3.5 does not reveal a great deal of variation in median own-country trade cost elasticities
across exporters. However, examining individual import markets reveals a great deal
more.
The modified model does overcome the restriction imposed by the CES import de-
mand system that own-country elasticity is strictly decreasing in market share. For
example, Japanese products represent a much smaller share of US agricultural expen-
diture than Brazilian products (0.0001% vs. 0.0051%). However, Japanese agricul-
tural exports to the United States tend to have intrinsic characteristics associated with
Japan’s technological, cultural and agro-ecological environment, whereas those exported
by Brazil do not. This can be characterized by high values of ai(j) or τ
A
ni(j) for many
Japanese products. Basic microeconomic theory thus suggests Japan’s own-country
elasticity should be less than Brazil’s, despite its smaller market share. Indeed, the
modified model predicts smaller magnitude own-country elasticity for Japan: the ratio
of Japan’s own-country trade cost elasticity relative to Brazil’s in the US market is
0.6467 in the modified model compared to 1.0003 in the EK model.
3.6 The Structure of Competition Faced by US Producers
The modified model can provide insight into the structure of global competition faced
by an individual country’s agricultural producers. In this section I will examine what
the model suggests about the United States’ competitors. There are two dimensions to
consider: The first is which competitors are most sensitive changes in US trade costs.
The second is which competitors’ trade costs US market share is most sensitive to.
These two sets of countries will likely have a great deal of overlap. The first consists
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of countries that are most likely to have low price offers the same goods, i.e., close
substitutes. The second set will include close substitutes, but will also be influenced by
the size of competitor’s market share.
The last column of Table 3.5 contains median relative elasticities with respect to US
trade costs. These results suggest, sensibly, that Canada is the closest substitute for
the United States, while there will be relatively few agricultural products for which the
United States and Costa Rica will compete head-to-head. Importantly, the CES import
demand system cannot produce this distinction. Costa Rica’s median relative market
share response to changes in US trade costs is only about 90% of that predicted by the
EK model, whereas Canada’s is more than eight times larger.
Examining elasticities with respect to US trade costs across import markets reveals
that South Africa, Argentina, Russia and Canada tend to have the largest elasticities
with respect to US trade costs. The indirect effect of a bilateral trade liberalization
between the US and any given import market is thus expected to diminish the market
share of these countries the most. Costa Rica, Malaysia, and Colombia tend to have
the smallest elasticities with respect to US trade costs and would thus be expected to
experience negligible changes in agricultural market share in response to bilateral trade
liberalization between the US and any given import market.
Now consider the second dimension of the competitive structure facing US agricul-
tural producers. In the EK model, elasticity is proportional to the competitor’s market
share, so the United States is always most sensitive to the country with the largest
market share. In the modified model, the set of competitors whose trade costs the US
market share is most sensitive to is influenced both by the competitor’s market share
and its similarity in comparative advantage. To make this clear, I re-write equation 3.7:
∂piAnUSA
∂τAnl
τAnl
piAnUSA
= θ
(
piAnl +
cov
(
piAnUSA(j), pi
A
nl(j)
)
piAnUSA
)
l 6= USA
The bottom row of Table 3.5 contains the median relative elasticity of US market share
with respect to each competitor. The modified model predicts that the response of US
market share to Canadian trade costs is more than six-times larger than that predicted
by the EK model and merely six-tenths as large with respect to Ecuador in the median
market. Looking across all import markets, the modified model predicts that US market
share tends to be most sensitive to changes in Canadian, French, Italian and Argentine
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trade costs.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter I made two modifications to the EK framework for trade and production
in the agricultural sector. First, I introduced a factor into the EK production tech-
nology that allows agro-ecological characteristics to influence patterns of comparative
advantage within the sector. Second, I allowed trade costs to vary across agricultural
products according to a parametric distribution. These two changes generate corre-
lation in patterns of specialization among countries with similar agro-ecological and
“gravity” characteristics, yielding a more nuanced picture of how bilateral trade and
production patterns respond to trade costs than the EK model, which assumes a CES
import demand system.
Next, I demonstrated that the structural equation used to estimate trade costs and
productivity distribution parameters in the EK framework can serve the same role
in the modified framework when specified as a random coefficients logit model. The
additional data requirements to estimate these parameters are minimized by using the
BLP methodology. This approach allows a discrete choice model to be estimated using
only sector-level market share data and information on the distribution of product-
specific production requirements and trade costs. The statistical significance of the
coefficients describing the distribution of land productivity suggests that agro-ecology is
a fundamental driver of bilateral trade and production patterns, and that heterogeneity
in trade costs cannot be ignored. This is further support for rejecting the CES import
demand system inherent in the EK model, as described in Chapter 2.
The modified model not only improves the precision with which a probabilistic Ri-
cardian model can predict shifts in trade patterns in response to policy, it also allows
the researcher to include information that the EK structure cannot admit. In partic-
ular, while I have not done so here, trade costs can be specified to include variables
like product-specific tariffs or other trade-distorting policies that are unevenly applied
across products. This feature alone offers a substantial improvement over the standard
EK model for agricultural policy analysis.
In future work I will explore alternative specifications for exporter characteristics and
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product requirements to improve the precision of the model’s market share predictions.
In particular, the statistical significance on unobserved heterogeneity around the effect of
an exporter’s share of temperate climate suggests that additional product requirements
are necessary to more precisely explain its relationship to market share. Alternatively,
it may be necessary to more sharply define agro-ecological characteristics within the
temperate climate zone. The model’s precision could be similarly enhanced by allowing
non-random factors to influence the distribution of trade costs.
In the next chapter I introduce the modified model assumptions on technology and
trade costs into a general equilibrium model. The more nuanced picture of substitution
patterns described by trade elasticities in the modified model will substantially improve
its value as a tool for evaluating the impact of a change in trade policy on the structure
of the agricultural sector.
Chapter 4
General Equilibrium
In this chapter I embed the modified agriculture sector technology and trade cost as-
sumptions introduced in Chapter 3 into a general equilibrium model with two tradable
sectors. I maintain the EK framework discussed in Chapter 2 for the manufacturing
sector. I solve for global equilibrium in the modified model as well as in a model where
the EK assumptions are maintained for both tradable sectors. I refer to this second
model as the EK model, although strictly speaking it is an extension of the model in
Eaton and Kortum (2002)[1] to multiple tradable sectors as in Shikher (2012)[4].
The base solutions for global equilibrium are nearly identical in the modified model
and the EK model. It is their implications for the response of trade and production pat-
terns to changes in trade costs that differ—and these differences are even more dramatic
in general equilibrium than what is suggested by the partial equilibrium elasticities in
Chapter 3. I highlight these differences by calculating simulated general equilibrium
elasticities with respect to changes in the trade costs of the United States and three of
its competitors: Canada, France and Costa Rica. According to the results in Chapter
3, Canada is the United States’ closest substitute and France is among the countries
whose trade costs affect US market share most. Costa Rica, on the other hand, tends to
have comparative advantage in a different set of agricultural products than the United
States. A change in its bilateral trade costs with a given market is therefore expected
to have a relatively minimal effect on US market share.
Consistent with the findings in Chapter 3, the general equilibrium model with the
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modified agricultural sector predicts the increase in US market share from higher Cana-
dian or French trade costs will tend to be larger than the median competitor, whereas
US market share elasticity with respect to Costa Rican trade costs is small relative to
the median in every import market. In contrast, the predictions of the EK model do not
discriminate between competitors that are close agricultural substitutes and those that
are not: US market share elasticity is virtually equal to the median for each exporter
in every import market. These divergent results suggest that ignoring the findings in
Chapter 2, viz., that the CES import demand system does not describe agricultural
trade, generates a misleading picture of the effect of policy on production and trade
patterns. The EK model is thus insufficient for analysis of global agricultural markets.
I highlight the other key advantage of the modified model in a second experiment.
Unlike the EK model, the modified model can be used to evaluate the trade and welfare
effects of changes in the dispersion of trade costs within the agricultural sector. This is
essential for applied agricultural policy analysis—it is the central issue in most global
policy debates. The policies that affect agricultural imports and exports are far from
uniformly distributed across products. Moreover, a distinct set of agricultural commodi-
ties are systematically subject to high trade barriers. This characterization implies that
analyzing the effects of changes in the average barrier to agricultural trade is of little
practical value.
To demonstrate how the model can be used to evaluate differences in the dispersion
of tariffs in a very simple way, I compare the trade and welfare effects of full agricultural
trade liberalization versus a partial liberalization that leaves just two commodities highly
protected. I simulate full agricultural “trade liberalization” by setting the average
bilateral agricultural trade cost equal to bilateral trade costs in the manufacturing
sector. This represents an average cut of 92% in agricultural trade costs. To simulate
partial liberalization, I maintain high trade barriers from the base parameterization on
cotton lint and cattle meat.
I find that the losses under partial relative to full liberalization are substantial and
unevenly distributed across countries. The countries that suffer the biggest losses in
real income from partial liberalization are Thailand, Indonesia and Ecuador. Cotton
represents a substantial portion of the estimated distribution of imported products in
all three of these countries, while their agro-ecological characteristics differ from the
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estimated requirements for cotton production.
Finally, the emphasis in this thesis is on introducing the analytical and empirical
methodology of the modified model under the simplest possible specification. The results
of the equally simplified counterfactual experiments should not be taken as formal policy
analysis or as an evaluation of the model’s performance. Rather, the experiments are
a demonstration of the type of analysis that could be performed with a more tailored
calibration.
4.1 Modified Model
The world is comprised of I countries engaged in bilateral trade. Importers are indexed
by n and exporters by i. There are two tradable sectors: agriculture and manufactur-
ing, and one non-tradable sector, services. Tradable sectors are each comprised of a
continuum of products indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] produced by many perfectly competitive
producers. Individual products are distinguished only by their intrinsic characteristics.
Countries are endowed with consumers who inelastically supply labor Ni and land Li.
Labor is allocated freely across all three sectors. Land is specific to agricultural produc-
tion. All production is constant returns to scale and markets are perfectly competitive.
Trade occurs as buyers in market n seek to purchase each product from the source
country that offers the lowest price. Three variables determine which country’s pro-
ducers offer the lowest price for an individual product in each market: factor prices,
bilateral trade costs, and product-specific productivity. Factor prices are determined in
equilibrium and bilateral trade costs are exogenous. Technology to produce quantity
qki (j) of tradable product j combines labor, land and intermediate inputs according to
the nested Cobb-Douglas function:
qki (j) = z
k
i (j)
(
N
βki
i (ai(j)Li)
1−βki
)αki
Qik
1−αki k = A,M βMi = 1∀i
where zki (j) is an independent random variable following a country and sector-specific
Frechet distribution as in Equation 2.2; ai(j) is country i, product j-specific land pro-
ductivity as described in Chapter 3; and Qki is an aggregate of intermediate inputs from
all three sectors combined in a Cobb-Douglas fashion as in Caliendo and Parro (2012)[3]:
Qki = Q
Aξ
k
A
i Q
Mξ
k
M
i Q
Sξ
k
S
i
∑
l=A,M,S
ξkl = 1
54
where QAi and Q
M
i are individual products from the agricultural and manufacturing
sectors combined according to a Dixit-Stiglitz technology with elasticity of substitution
σ > 0:
Qki =
 1∫
0
qki (j)
(σ−1)
σ dj

σ
σ−1
k = A,M (4.1)
The services sector produces a homogeneous good using only labor with productivity
zSi .
Exporters incur “iceberg” trade costs when selling products outside the domestic
market. In the agricultural sector, trade costs are product-specific and follow the para-
metric distribution described in Chapter 3. Trade costs are constant for all manufac-
tured products as in the EK framework. With perfect competition the prices offered for
product j, by exporter i in market n are therefore:
pAni(j) =
a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j)
zAi (j)
and pMni (j) =
cMi τ
M
ni
zMi (j)
where a˜i(j) ≡ ai(j)−αAi (1−βAi ) and cki is the cost of a sector k input bundle. For cost-
minimizing producers:
cki = κ
k
iw
αki β
k
i +(1−αki )ξkS
i r
αki (1−βki )
i p
A(1−α
k
i )ξ
k
A
i p
M(1−α
k
i )ξ
k
M
i (4.2)
where κki is a constant.
1
Buyers in market n purchase each product from the exporter with the lowest price
offer. The price actually paid for product j in market n is therefore:
pkn(j) = mini{pkni(j)}
Given the aggregation technology buyers use to assemble individual goods from each
sector, a unit price index for sector k is:2
pkn =
 1∫
0
pkn(j)
−(σ−1)dj
1/(1−σ) =
 1∫
0
p(1−σ)dGkn(p)dp
1/(1−σ)
1 κki =
αki β
k−α
k
i β
k
i
i
(
αki (1− βki )
)−αki (1−βki ) (zSi ξkS(1− αki ))−(1−αki )ξkS (ξkA(1− αki ))−(1−αki )ξkA (ξkM (1− αki ))−(1−αki )ξAM
2 See Appendix D for details.
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Using the price distributions for agricultural products, GAn (p),
3 this becomes:
pAn = γ
(∫
ΩAn (j)
(σ−1)
θ dFan(a˜)dF
A
τn(τ )
) 1
1−σ
(4.3)
Where ΩAn (j) =
I∑
l=1
TAl
(
a˜l(j)c
A
l τ
A
nl(j)
)−θ
; γ = Γ
[
θ+1−σ
θ
] 1
(1−σ) , and Γ(·) is the gamma
function, so the parameters satisfy θ > 1 − σ; and dFan(a˜)dFAτn(τ ) is the joint density
of a˜ = [a˜1, . . . , a˜I ] and τ
A
n =
[
τAn1, . . . , τ
A
nI
]
4 over all agricultural products consumed
in import market n described in Chapter 3. Caliendo and Parro (2012)[3] and Shikher
(2012)[4] show that the price index under the EK framework that describes the manu-
facturing sector is:
pMn = γΩ
M
−1
θ
n (4.4)
where ΩMn =
I∑
l=1
TMl (c
M
l τ
M
nl )
−θ.
The share of import market n’s expenditure on sector k products is equivalent to
the probability exporter i offers the lowest price, denoted pikni. As I showed in Chapter
3, for agriculture this is:
piAni ≡
∫
TAi (a˜ic
A
i τ
A
ni)
−θ
ΩAn (j)
dFan(a˜)dF
A
τn(τ ) (4.5)
For the manufacturing sector, since land is not used in production and since I have
assumed trade costs are constant:
piMni =
TMi (c
M
i τ
M
ni )
−θ
ΩMn
(4.6)
as in Equation 2.4.
4.2 Equilibrium
Equilibrium consists of factor prices wi and ri; price indices for tradable goods p
A
i
and pMi ; trade shares pi
A
ni and pi
M
ni ; and labor allocation rules such that producers and
consumers are optimizing; factor and product markets clear and trade is balanced.
Equations 4.5 and 4.6 define equilibrium trade shares and Equations 4.3 and 4.4 define
equilibrium price indices.
3 I derive this distribution in Appendix D. GMn (p) is derived in EK.
4 a˜1 = [a˜1(0), a˜1(1)], τ
A
n1 = [τ
A
n1(0), τ
A
n1(1)]
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The consumer’s problem is to choose quantities of individual products qki (j) from
all three sectors to maximize:
ui(Q) = Q
Aλ
A
i
i Q
Mλ
M
i
i Q
Sλ
S
i
i
subject to the budget constraint: wiNi+riLi. Here Q
k
i is the sector k aggregate defined
by Equation 4.1. This utility function implies that consumers spend a constant share
λki of their total income on products from sector k.
In solving the model, I make use of expressions for agricultural output and expendi-
ture in terms of wages, exogenous labor endowments and parameters as in Dekle, Eaton
and Kortum (2008)[29]. I begin with the tradable products market clearing and trade
balance conditions:
Y ki =
I∑
n=1
pikniX
k
n = X
k
i −Dki k = A,M (4.7)
where Y ki is country i’s gross sector k production and X
k
i is country i’s gross absorption
of sector k goods. Under the trade balance condition country i may be a net importer
of sector k goods in the amount Dki , however economy-level trade balance requires
DAi +D
M
i = 0. Sectoral trade deficits are exogenous and
I∑
i=1
Dki = 0.
Individual products are purchased by consumers for final consumption and by pro-
ducers as intermediate inputs. Total demand for sector k goods in country i is:
Xki = λ
k
iXi + (1− αki )(ξMk YMi + ξAk Y Ai ) (4.8)
where Xi is total final absorption and (1− αki )(ξMk YMi + ξAk Y Ai ) is demand for sector k
intermediate inputs.
Substituting Equation 4.8 in Equation 4.7 yields:
YMi =
λMi Xi + (1− αAi )ξAMY Ai −DMi
1− (1− αMi )ξMM
and Y Ai =
λAi Xi + (1− αMi )ξMA YMi −DAi
1− (1− αAi )ξAA
(4.9)
With perfect competition, value-added equals factor payments in each sector:
V ki = wiN
k
i + riL
k
i
5 (4.10)
5 LMi = L
S
i = 0
57
Exporter is GDP is therefore:
Yi = wiNi + riLi = wiNi + α
A
i (1− βAi )Y Ai
where the first equality follows from the labor market clearing condition and the second
follows from the agricultural producer’s problem.
Substituting Equation 4.9 for the manufacturing sector and the trade balance con-
dition Xi = Yi into the agricultural sector, Equation 4.9 yields an expression for agri-
cultural output in terms of the total value of labor, the exogenous agricultural sector
deficit DAi and model parameters:
Y Ai = κ
A
1iwiNi + κ
A
2iD
A
i (4.11)
where the κ terms are functions of parameters.6 Similarly, for the manufacturing
sector:7
YMi = κ
M
1i wiNi + κ
M
2i Y
A
i + κ
M
3iD
A
i (4.12)
where Y Ai is calculated as in 4.11. Substituting this into the market clearing condition
yields an equation for manufacturing sector expenditure:
XMi = κ
M
1i wiNi + κ
M
2i Y
A
i + κ
M
4iD
A
i (4.13)
4.3 Data and Calibration
Computing world equilibrium requires data on labor and land endowments and values
for the utility function parameters λki ; production function parameters κ
k
i , α
k
i , β
k
i , ξ
k
l ,
T ki and θ; trade costs τ
k
ni and land productivity ai; and the elasticity of substitution
parameter σ. Data on arable land in hectares and total labor force is obtained from the
World Bank World Development Indicators. Values for ai(j) and τ
A
ni(j) in the modified
model are estimated as in Chapter 3. Values for τAni in the EK model are estimated as
in Chapter 2.
6 κA1i =
λAi (1−(1−αMi )ξMM )+λMi (1−αMi )ξMA
(1−(1−αMi )ξMM−(1−αAi )ξAA)−(λAi (1−(1−αMi )ξMM )+λMi (1−αMi )ξMA )αAi (1−βAi )
,
κA2i =
(1−αMi )ξMA −(1−(1−αMi )ξMM )
(1−(1−αMi )ξMM−(1−αAi )ξAA)−(λAi (1−(1−αMi )ξMM )+λMi (1−αMi )ξMA )αAi (1−βAi )
,
κA3i =
λAi (1−(1−αMi )ξMM )+λMi (1−αMi )ξMA )αAi (1−βAi )+((1−αMi )ξMA −(1−αAi )ξAA
(1−(1−αMi )ξMM−(1−αAi )ξAA)−αAi (1−βAi )(λAi (1−(1−αMi )ξMM )+λMi (1−αMi )ξMA )
7 κM1i =
λMi
1−(1−αMi )ξMM
, κM2i =
λMi α
A
i (1−βAi )+(1−αAi )ξAM
1−(1−αMi )ξMM
, κM3i =
1
1−(1−αMi )ξMM
, κM4i =
1−αMi
1−(1−αMi )
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To estimate manufacturing trade costs τMni , I assemble bilateral market shares fol-
lowing the procedure described in Chapter 2 using data on production and trade data
from the CEPII TradeProd database, described in de Sousa et al (2012)[30]. Using a
concordance between FAO item codes and the HS classification provided by the FAO,
I confirm that there is no overlap in the products that comprise the agricultural and
manufacturing sector data. I use OLS to estimate manufacturing sector trade costs as
in Chapter 2 from:
ln
piMni
piMnn
= SMi − SMn − θ
(
bMni + l
M
ni +
6∑
r=1
dMrni + ex
M
i + EU
M
ni +NAFTA
M
ni + ξ
M
ni
)
(4.14)
Estimates for SMi are reported in Appendix B. Estimates for ex
M
i are reported in
Appendix C. The remaining parameter estimates from this equation are reported in
Appendix F.
As in EK, I obtain estimates of T ki in the modified model from
ˆ˜SAi and Sˆ
M
i , the
coefficients on producer fixed effects from Equations 3.13 and 4.14. Estimates of TAi for
the EK model are obtained from SAi estimates from Equation 2.6. The methodology is
detailed in Appendix G.
Value-added αki , intermediate inputs shares ξ
k
l , and consumption shares λ
k
i are ob-
tained from input-output tables for the early 2000’s from the OECD-STAN database[31].
Input-output tables are available for 30 countries. I assign the average value for each
parameter to the remaining countries. The values of αki , ξ
k
l , and λ
k
i used for each coun-
try are listed in Appendix H. I set βAi = 0.66, the mean estimate of labor’s share in
production in Gollin (2002)[32]. I set σ = 2.0 as in Ruhl (2008)[33] and θ = 4.12, the
baseline estimate from Simonovska and Waugh (2011)[6]. Finally, I set zSi = 1 and
DAi = 0, leaving them as free parameters.
4.4 Solution
I use the same approach to solve for equilibrium in both the modified and EK models.
The only difference is that I use equation 4.3 and 4.5 to solve for the agricultural
price index and market shares in the modified model and equations 4.4 and 4.6 for the
agriculture and manufacturing sectors in the EK model.
To solve for equilibrium given the structural parameter values in Table 4.1, I first
guess a vector of wages w¯ = [w¯1, . . . , w¯I ]. Let Y
A
i (w¯) be the solution to Equation 4.11
59
Table 4.1: Sources and Values for Structural Parameters
Parameter Source Value
a˜i(j), T
A
i ,
τAni(j), τ
A
ni
Estimates from Equation 3.11 for
the modified model; Estimates
from Equation 2.6 for the EK
model
See Tables 2.2 3.1, 3.2 and
Appendix B, C and G
TMi , τ
M
ni Estimates from Equation 4.14 See Appendix B, C, F and G
λki , α
k
i , ξ
k
l Input-Output tables [31] See Appendix H
βi Gollin (2002) [32] 0.66
zSi – 1 ∀ i
Dki – D
A
i = D
M
i = 0 ∀i
θ Simonovska and Waugh (2011) [6] 4.12
σ Ruhl (2008) [33] 2.00
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consistent with the guessed wage vector and country i’s total labor endowment. I use
the following equilibrium condition from the agricultural producer’s problem with each
country’s total arable land endowment to solve for land rent associated with Y Ai (w¯):
riLi = α
A
i (1− βAi )Y Ai (4.15)
Given w¯, sectoral price indices are 2× I equations in 2× I unknowns. Therefore, I can
solve for the agriculture and manufacturing sector price indices in each country given
the guessed wages and calibrated parameters. I simulate the integral in the modified
model agricultural price index as:
pAn =
γ
ns
 ns∑
j=1
ΩAn (j)
σ−1
θ
 11−σ
using the same ns products I used to estimate trade costs and productivity distribution
parameters in Chapter 3. Let pAi (w¯), p
M
i (w¯), and ri(w¯) be the solution for price indices
and land rent for each country consistent with the guessed wages. I use these, along
with w¯ to solve for the cost of an input bundle in each sector from equilibrium condition
4.2.
I then use the resulting cAi (w¯) and c
M
i (w¯) with the estimates of τ
A
ni(j), and a˜i(j), to
solve for agricultural market shares piAni(w¯) using Equation 3.4 for the modified model,
simulating the integral as in Equation 3.11. Correspondingly, I use estimates of τAni from
Chapter 2 to solve for agricultural trade shares using Equation 2.4 for the EK model. I
solve for manufacturing sector market shares in both models using τˆMni in Equation 4.6.
Substituting Equations 4.11 and 4.12 into the country i manufacturing sector goods
market clearing condition yields a system of I equations that relate the value of labor
in each country to its value in all other countries.
κM1i wiNi + κ
M
2i Y
A
i + κ
M
3iD
A
i =
I∑
n=1
(
κM1nwnNn + κ
M
2nY
A
n + κ
M
4nD
A
n
)
(4.16)
If Equation 4.16 holds under the guessed value w¯, the solution is attained. If not,
the vector of wages is adjusted until it does. To complete the equilibrium solution, I
calculate labor shares for each sector according to Equation 4.10.
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Base solutions for each model are reported in Appendix I. As expected, the equilib-
rium solutions are nearly the same, with the sole and unsurprising exception of the agri-
cultural price index. Differences between the two models’ predictions for trade shares
and GDP are not significantly different from zero and both models predict identical
distributions of labor across sectors.
Predicted bilateral market shares in both models fit observed market shares well, but
predictions for other aggregate measures are weakly correlated with the data. Since the
base solutions are highly correlated with each other, this suggests model performance
could be improved by adjusting the calibration of structural parameters other than trade
costs. There are several degrees of freedom available in the model for such adjustment.
4.5 Simulated General Equilibrium Elasticities
The primary difference between the EK and modified model is in their implications
for changes in equilibrium outcomes in response to changes in structural parameters.
To examine these differences I calculate general equilibrium elasticities with respect to
US, French, Canadian and Costa Rican trade costs and compare the predicted magni-
tudes and distribution of direct and indirect effects in the two models. General equilib-
rium elasticities for a given exporter are calculated by simulating a 1% increase in its
agricultural trade costs and then calculating the percent change in each competitor’s
agricultural market share over the base solution.
The variation in sensitivity across competitors observed in partial equilibrium elas-
ticities in Chapter 3 increases in general equilibrium. General equilibrium effects mag-
nify the difference between the elasticity of the closest and most distant competitors
observed in partial equilibrium. This is in stark contrast to the EK model’s by now
familiar prediction that the market share adjustment in response to any of these three
is virtually identical for every competitor. Unlike in partial equilibrium, the EK model
does generate some variation in general equilibrium elasticities of substitution across
competitors, however it is negligible. The variation in cross-country general equilibrium
elasticity as measured by the standard deviation with respect to US trade costs ranges
from a minimum of 1,230 times the standard deviation in the EK model in the Costa
Rican market to several thousand times the standard deviation in the EK model in
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many other markets.
As in partial equilibrium, comparing the cross-country elasticities generated by the
EK and modified models reveals considerable differences in the magnitude of the indirect
effects of changes in trade costs predicted by each model. The EK model will tend to
over-predict the indirect effects of changes in Canadian and French trade costs and
under-predict the indirect effects of changes in US and Costa Rican costs. The relative
magnitudes are particularly divergent in the case of Costa Rica, for which the elasticities
predicted by the modified model are vastly greater than those predicted by the EK model
in every import market.
Table 4.2 compares the indirect effects of changes in Canadian, French, and Costa
Rican costs on US market share to their effects on the median competitor in select import
markets. The first column under each exporter contains the elasticity of US market share
with respect to the exporter’s trade costs, relative to the median value predicted by the
modified model. The second column contains the US elasticity relative to the median
predicted by the EK model. It is immediately clear that the modified model generates
a much more nuanced picture of the magnitude and direction of production and trade
shifts in response to a bilateral policy change. These results reaffirm that the EK model
generates very little variation in cross-trade elasticities across competitors.
The relative elasticities in Table 4.2 demonstrate that the modified model consis-
tently predicts the US is a closer substitute for Canada and France than it is for Costa
Rica. US market share is more elastic than the median country to changes in Cana-
dian trade costs in every market except the domestic market and more elastic than
the median to French trade costs in all but a few. In contrast, US market share is far
less sensitive than the median exporter to changes in Costa Rican trade costs in every
import market.
Table 4.2 also suggests how trade driven by natural endowment differences as op-
posed to trade driven by random technological productivity differences has different
implications for the distribution of indirect effects across competitors. Notice that the
few import markets in which the United States is less sensitive than the median with
respect to changes in French trade costs are those that are the most agro-ecologically
similar to either France or the United States. In such markets, the comparative advan-
tage of US and French producers is less likely to be driven by relatively high values of
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Table 4.2: The Elasticity of US Market Share Relative to the Median Exporter
Canada Costa Rica France
Modified
Model
EK
Model
Modified
Model
EK
Model
Modified
Model
EK
Model
Canada - - 0.09 1.00 0.82 1.00
Chile 7.67 1.00 0.00 1.00 7.23 1.00
Costa Rica 1.43 1.00 - - 1.42 1.00
Czech Republic 15.02 1.00 0.00 1.00 12.32 1.00
Ecuador 3.32 1.00 0.34 1.00 3.15 1.00
Finland 14.2 1.00 0.01 1.00 3.63 1.00
Hungary 13.83 1.00 0.00 1.00 7.55 1.00
Ireland 6.60 1.00 0.07 1.00 0.76 1.00
Israel 3.08 1.00 0.47 1.00 2.51 1.00
Japan 14.90 1.00 0.00 1.00 5.22 1.00
Malaysia 1.28 1.00 0.13 1.00 1.06 1.00
Mexico 56.25 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.20 1.00
Poland 14.86 1.00 0.01 0.95 4.56 1.00
Portugal 26.35 1.00 0.00 1.00 14.48 1.00
South Africa 7.15 1.00 0.00 0.98 0.62 1.00
Spain 17.48 1.00 0.03 1.00 1.25 1.00
Turkey 13.04 1.00 0.01 0.85 1.12 1.00
UK 18.67 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.67 1.00
Uruguay 6.68 1.00 0.02 1.00 6.62 1.00
USA 0.19 0.80 0.26 0.80 0.73 0.80
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ai(j) and more likely to be driven by relatively high realizations of z
A
i (j). The United
States and France are not necessarily closer substitutes for each other than any other
competitor as a source for products in which the advantage is primarily technological.
On the other hand, the markets in which US elasticity with respect to Costa Rican costs
is highest relative to the median are those in which incentives to trade with Costa Rica
are least likely to derive from agro-ecological differences.
4.6 Full vs. Partial Agricultural Liberalization
In this section I explore the effects of full versus partial agricultural trade liberalization
using the modified model. The ability to simulate changes in product-specific trade
costs as opposed to average costs only is critical for applied agricultural policy analysis,
in which implications of changes in the dispersion of trade costs are of central interest.
Such an experiment cannot be carried out using the EK model since trade costs are of
necessity assumed constant across products.
I simulate agricultural trade liberalization by setting average bilateral trade costs
in the agricultural sector equal to bilateral manufacturing trade cost estimates. This
represents an average cut in agricultural trade costs of 92%. To simulate partial liberal-
ization I add the difference between average agricultural and manufacturing trade costs
back for just two products: cotton lint and cattle meat. I maintain product-specific
deviations from average in order to allow for non-policy differences in trade costs across
products such as transport and handling requirements.
The implicit claim behind this experiment is that manufacturing trade is as close to
free trade as it is possible to achieve, and that any difference in average trade costs be-
tween sectors represents barriers that could potentially be reduced. This is admittedly
a simplified way to contemplate agricultural liberalization. The results will be highly
influenced by the degree to which a country is an efficient manufactured products ex-
porter. Moreover, by calibrating the model with Dki = 0, I have effectively imposed
sector-by-sector trade balance. Sector-level specialization will therefore be limited.
Total agricultural trade increases dramatically under both full and partial liberaliza-
tion. This is illustrated in Table 4.3 which compares the increase in agricultural imports
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under the two scenarios for selected import markets.8 I denote domestic market share
under the base solution, full liberalization and partial liberalization respectively as piA
∗
nn ,
piA
F
nn and pi
AP
nn . The first column displays the import penetration ratio under full lib-
eralization relative to the base solution. The model predicts that trade liberalization
increases the share of imports in agricultural expenditure by nearly 100 times in Ireland
and South Africa and over 100 times in Kenya and New Zealand.
The second column compares the increase in trade under full agricultural liberal-
ization to the increase when just cotton lint and cattle meat are left unprotected, as
revealed by the ratio of import penetration under partial liberalization relative to full
liberalization. The difference between the import share of agricultural expenditure is
negligible for just under half of the import markets in the data. For others the difference
is highly significant. In particular, the share of imports in agricultural expenditure falls
by more than one-third in Indonesia, Ecuador and Thailand under partial liberaliza-
tion. This can be traced to the importance of cotton in these three countries’ estimated
import distributions and the fact that their ecological characteristics differ substantially
from cotton’s estimated agro-ecological production requirements.
Table 4.3: Increase in Ag Trade - Full vs. Partial Liberalization
Increase in Ag Imports over Base Solution
Country
Full Liberalization Partial /Full Liberalization(
1−piAFnn
1−piA∗nn
) (
1−piAPnn
1−piAFnn
)
Indonesia 32.01 0.54
Ecuador 50.29 0.65
Thailand 6.15 0.66
Chile 15.30 0.79
South Africa 96.79 0.93
Netherlands 35.19 0.99
Italy 7.49 1.00
Costa Rica 2.23 1.00
Austria 27.50 1.00
8 Full results are listed in Appendix J.
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Table 4.4 examines the difference between full and partial agricultural liberalization
from the perspective of countries as exporters.9 The results demonstrate that it is
important to capture product-specific deviations from average trade costs in order to
understand the impact of trade policy on agricultural trade and production patterns.
Leaving just two commodities highly protected implies significant shifts in sources of
agricultural products.
The first column illustrates the magnitude of selected exporters’ increase in foreign
agricultural market share. It contains the average percent increase in piAni (i 6= n) in
moving from the base solution to full liberalization. The biggest increases are gener-
ally among the poorest countries in the sample and Central and East European coun-
tries. For example, Table 4.4 indicates that agricultural trade liberalization increases
Malaysia’s average share of foreign agricultural expenditure more than 900% over the
base solution. This is indeed a dramatic increase, but bear in mind that initial values
of piAni tend to be very small the median domestic market share in the base solution is
0.88. Moreover, because of the structure of this experiment, the relative magnitude of
these gains is influenced in part by initial differences in agricultural and manufacturing
sector trade costs.
The second column compares the average percent increase in each exporter’s foreign
market share under partial relative to full liberalization. These results suggest that
agricultural producers in some countries may gain more from partial than full liberal-
ization, while others experience significantly smaller increases in foreign market share
when trade liberalization is uneven across products.
Full agricultural trade liberalization results in significant shifts in production and
trade patterns from the base solution. The degree to which agricultural market share
has been re-allocated across exporters in a given market can be measured by the rank
correlation between exporter market shares in a given importer in the base solution and
after liberalization. Table 4.5 reports the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between
market shares of foreign producers in the base solution and after full liberalization
for each import market. A smaller value of the correlation coefficient implies greater
reallocation of agricultural expenditure across exporters. The largest reallocations in
market share across exporters are in Iran, Portugal, Malaysia and The Netherlands.
9 The full results are listed in Appendix J.
67
Table 4.4: Increase in Average Foreign Market Share - Full vs. Partial Liberalization
Ave. % Change in piAni from Base Solution, (i 6= n)
Exporter Full Liberalization Partial /Full Liberalization
Costa Rica 384.07 0.95
Thailand 413.55 0.98
Malaysia 902.61 1.00
USA 68.92 1.00
Italy 192.5 1.00
Netherlands 165.44 1.01
Colombia 245.63 1.02
Ecuador 192.12 1.02
Shifts in agricultural import patterns due to agricultural liberalization are smallest in
Central and East European countries.
Table 4.5: Size of Shifts in Bilateral Ag Trade Patterns
Import Market
Rank correlation
Import Market
Rank correlation
piA
∗
ni , pi
AF
ni pi
A∗
ni , pi
AF
ni
Iran 0.50 Germany 0.75
Portugal 0.53 Turkey 0.75
Malaysia 0.53 Hungary 0.75
Netherlands 0.56 Czech Republic 0.75
Denmark 0.56 Brazil 0.76
Canada 0.57 Poland 0.77
Russia 0.57 Mexico 0.77
New Zealand 0.59 Slovakia 0.77
Israel 0.59 Austria 0.79
While the results in the preceding table suggest that producers in a handful of
countries may benefit from partial liberalization, Table 4.6 shows that consumer gains
in terms of real income are uniformly smaller under partial liberalization relative to
full liberalization. The first column lists the percent increase in real income under full
agricultural liberalization for selected countries.10 While the increase is small for most
countries, considering that agricultural products only represent an average of 5% of
10 The full results are listed in Appendix J.
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consumption expenditure, these gains are not insubstantial.
The second column of Table 4.6 contains the ratio of real income gains under partial
relative to full liberalization. These results demonstrate that the ability of the modified
model to simulate changes in the structure of trade costs more complex than cuts to
average costs is a significant asset. The distribution of product-specific trade costs has
important consequences for the distribution welfare gains from trade liberalization across
countries. For many countries, leaving cotton lint and cattle meat highly protected has
a negligible impact on gains from liberalization while for others particularly Indonesia
and Thailand the loss in real income from partial liberalization is substantial.
Table 4.6: Increase in Real Income from Ag Liberalization
Percent Change in Real Income over Base Solution
Country Full Liberalization Partial /Full Liberalization
Indonesia 16.16% 0.78
Thailand 10.14% 0.85
Netherlands 4.22% 1.00
Malaysia 3.41% 0.99
Italy 2.63% 1.00
Chile 0.62% 0.99
Ecuador 0.51% 0.96
Costa Rica 0.39% 1.00
USA 0.37% 1.00
4.7 Conclusion
The modified model provides a much richer picture of the competitive structure facing
agricultural producers around the world than existing general equilibrium models of
international trade. This generates more precise predictions of the effects of policy on
patterns of bilateral trade and production in addition to the traditional measures of
welfare gains.
An equally, if not more important contribution of the methodology I have introduced
here is its ability to handle changes in the distribution of tariffs or other policies within a
sector. I am unaware of any other model in the literature on heterogeneous productivity
trade models that has this feature. The results of the simulated partial agricultural
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liberalization confirm that the distribution of tariff cuts can have non-trivial effects
on the distribution of both trade and welfare gains from trade liberalization across
countries, even in this very simplistic and stylized model.
Future work will focus on applications of the framework I have introduced here.
The model is expressly intended for applied policy analysis, including but not limited
to evaluations of preferential trade agreements at the regional and multilateral level.
This is its most obvious use, but it can also be specified to evaluate any taxes, subsi-
dies or other policy or non-policy factors that affect the costs of producing or trading
agricultural products. The model may also be used to examine the extent to which the
existing structure of agricultural policy instruments restricts the realization of agricul-
tural comparative advantage through international trade, and the extent to which these
restrictions fall disproportionately on developing countries as in the influential work
of Anderson and Martin (2006)[23], Hertel and Winters (2005)[24], Boue¨t, Mevel and
Orden (2006) [25] and many others.
Improved forecasts for shifts in trade and production patterns have significant value
beyond the world of policy-making. The structure presented here may be useful to
industrial users and traders of agricultural commodities to analyze how changes in the
agricultural production cost structure might alter optimal sourcing and marketing deci-
sions. Additionally, researchers with an interest in the connection between agriculture
and the environment may find this framework’s ability to more precisely predict shifts in
production patterns useful in evaluations of the environmental consequences of policies,
technologies and other factors that influence agricultural production costs.
Central to a successful application of this framework will be a more careful calibra-
tion and specification of land productivity and trade cost distributions. The primary
advantage of this framework is the flexibility of its treatment of the agricultural pro-
duction structure. However, along with that flexibility comes a degree of complexity,
which I have attempted to minimize in this work.
Pursuant to refining the values of structural parameters, it will be useful to evaluate
the model in the context of a historical agricultural policy reform. Two of the most
attractive candidates for such an exercise are the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the periodic fundamental reforms of the European Union’s Common
Agricultural Policy. Existing ex post evaluations of models constructed to forecast
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the trade and welfare effects of the NAFTA by Kehoe (2003)[11], Caliendo and Parro
(2012)[3] and Shikher (2012)[4] among others make it a particularly attractive candidate
for such an evaluation since they offer a ready counter-example.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, non-random or non-independent
sources of product heterogeneity may also influence patterns of trade in the manufac-
turing sector. It seems likely, for example, that mining and the manufactured food
and beverages industries are likely to have similar natural endowment-based sources of
comparative advantage that play a key role in driving production and trade patterns.
The model’s robustness to the assumptions on the manufacturing sector, even when
agricultural trade is the focus, should thus be examined. At a minimum, it would be
worthwhile to use the tests introduced in Chapter 2 to examine whether the CES import
demand system holds in the manufacturing sector as a whole or at the sub-sector level.
Even if the CES import demand system holds for the manufacturing sector as a
whole, it would be useful to explore the interactions between agriculture and the indus-
tries for which its outputs represent a large share of intermediate inputs. A finer classi-
fication of the manufacturing sector may have important consequences for predictions of
the response of bilateral trade and production patterns to changes in agricultural trade
costs. Moreover, Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012)[5] point out that mod-
els with inter-sectoral linkages find that gains from trade liberalization are increasing
in the share of intermediate goods in production. Such a modification would therefore
almost certainly amplify predicted gains from agricultural trade liberali-zation.
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Appendix B
Producer Fixed Effects Estimates
Table B.1: Coefficient Estimates: Ski
Agriculture
Country EK Model (SˆAi ) Modified (
ˆ˜SAi ) Manufacturing (Sˆ
M
i )
Argentina 3.16*** 2.32*** 0.29*
Australia 2.30*** -0.10 -0.90***
Austria -0.06* -1.53*** 0.04
Brazil 1.30*** 0.98** 0.38**
Canada -1.45*** -1.81*** 0.13
Chile 0.38** -0.22 -0.33**
Colombia -1.62*** 1.35*** 0.16
Costa Rica -3.24*** 2.56*** -1.66***
Denmark -0.61 -1.81*** -0.26*
Ecuador -1.25*** 2.70*** 0.18
Estonia 0.14** 1.59*** -0.47***
Finland -1.56** -2.96*** 0.14
France 1.33*** -1.04** 0.29*
Germany -1.26 -2.34*** 0.02
Hungary 1.73*** 1.22** -0.46***
Continued on next page
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Agriculture
Country EK Model (SˆAi ) Modified (
ˆ˜SAi ) Manufacturing (Sˆ
M
i )
India 2.31 3.38*** 0.88***
Indonesia -0.32*** 0.49 -0.52***
Iran 2.25*** 3.42*** 2.70***
Ireland 0.15*** 0.08 -0.98***
Israel -1.24*** 0.14 1.04***
Italy 0.59*** -1.88*** 0.25*
Japan -4.57*** -4.76*** 1.31***
Kenya -0.89*** 2.53*** 0.51***
Malaysia -0.84*** 0.38 -0.80***
Mexico 0.56 0.45 -1.27***
Netherlands -2.60*** -2.84*** -1.27***
New Zealand 0.47*** 0.49 -0.18
Czech Republic 1.14*** -0.03 0.06
Poland 1.45*** -1.33** 0.50***
Portugal -1.31 -2.26*** 0.06
Romania 2.42*** 2.79*** 0.51***
Russia 2.55*** -1.97*** 0.11
Slovenia -1.21 1.07** 0.04
Slovakia 0.91*** 2.01*** -0.31*
South Africa 1.92*** 0.62 0.00
Spain 1.15*** -1.14** 0.20
Sweden -3.66*** -3.62*** -0.07
Thailand -1.81*** 1.11** -0.72***
Turkey 3.43*** 1.80*** 0.32*
UK -1.91** -2.75*** 0.01
USA 1.77*** -1.08** 0.50***
Uruguay 0.35*** 1.98*** -0.42**
Appendix C
Exporter Fixed Effects Estimates
Table C.1: Coefficient Estimates: exki
Agriculture (eˆxAi )
Country EK Model Modified Manufacturing (eˆxMi )
Argentina 2.06*** 3.67*** -0.17
Australia 4.45*** 4.05*** 1.51***
Austria 0.46 -1.01 0.41*
Brazil 3.69*** 2.68*** 1.13***
Canada 6.28*** 8.93*** 1.03***
Chile 3.09*** 2.72*** -0.37*
Colombia -0.99 -2.04 -2.54***
Costa Rica -1.92 -3.22 -1.43***
Denmark 3.73*** 2.85*** 0.55**
Ecuador -3.13 -2.80 -3.78***
Estonia -8.47 -7.67 -2.24***
Finland -3.41 -4.38 0.79***
France 5.21*** 4.82*** 2.08***
Germany 5.21*** 5.88*** 3.04***
Hungary -2.83 -2.57 -0.25
Continued on next page
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Table C.1 – continued from previous page
Agriculture (eˆxAi )
Country EK Model Modified Manufacturing (eˆxMi )
India -0.20 2.18*** -0.08
Indonesia 3.76*** 2.48*** 1.69***
Iran -4.36 -1.44 -5.86***
Ireland -2.80 -3.37 1.51***
Israel -0.85 -2.31 -2.08***
Italy 5.55*** 4.45*** 2.17***
Japan 1.09* 1.91*** 2.24***
Kenya -3.51 -3.66 -6.30***
Malaysia -0.33 -3.80 2.27***
Mexico 0.63 1.62** 1.85***
Netherlands 5.50*** 4.66*** 2.85***
New Zealand 1.22* 1.27* -0.40*
Czech Republic -4.54 -5.32 -0.73***
Poland -4.24 -5.33 -1.03***
Portugal 2.63*** 1.55** -0.55**
Romania -5.81 -3.95 -2.17***
Russia -2.58 -3.68 0.37*
Slovenia -9.83 -9.85 -1.85***
Slovakia -10.57 -9.69 -1.51***
South Africa 1.39** 1.71*** 0.24
Spain 5.21*** 4.59*** 1.26***
Sweden 0.22 0.84 1.53***
Thailand 1.68** 2.33*** 1.99***
Turkey -0.03 0.56 -0.59**
UK 4.61*** 4.97*** 2.21***
USA 7.03*** 8.13*** 3.11***
Uruguay -4.29 -2.75 -1.91***
Appendix D
Detailed Derivation of piAni and p
A
n ,
Modified Model
D.1 Market n agriculture sector price distribution
Claim: The prices of agricultural products purchased in market n are distributed fol-
lowing:
GAn (p) = 1−
∫
exp{−
I∑
m=1
T km(a˜m(j)c
k
mτ
k
nm(j))
−θpθ}dFan(a˜)dF kτn(τ )dp
Proof: First, the probability country i offers a price less than p for product j in market
n is:
Pr
(
pAni(j) ≤ p
)
= Pr
(
a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j)
zAi (j)
≤ p
)
= 1− FAzi
(
a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j)
p
)
= 1− exp{−TAi (a˜i(j)cAi τAni(j))−θpθ} ≡ GAni(p(j))
The price actually paid for product j is:
pAn (j) = mini{pAni(j)}
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Therefore, pAn (j) ≤ p unless all countries’ price offers are greater than p. Given the
density of a˜(j) = [a˜1(j), . . . , a˜I(j)] and τ
A
n (j) =
[
τAn1(j), . . . , τ
A
nI(j)
]
:
Pr
(
pAn (j) > p
)
= Pr
(
pAnl(j) > p ∀l
)
=
I∏
l=1
(
1−GAni(p(j))
)
=
I∏
l=1
exp{−TAl (a˜l(j)cAl τAnl(j))−θpθ}
The probability product j is purchased at a price less than p in market n is therefore:
Pr
(
pAnl(j) ≤ p ∀l
)
= 1− exp{−
I∑
l=1
TAl (a˜l(j)c
A
l τ
A
nl(j))
−θpθ}
Since a˜i(j), τ
A
ni(j) and z
A
i (j) follow independent distributions in each country, the dis-
tribution of agricultural prices in market n is the integral of this expression over the
density of a˜ = [a˜(0), . . . , a˜(1)] and τAn =
[
τAn (0), . . . , τ
A
n (1)
]
over all products purchased
in market n. Therefore,
GAn (p) = 1−
∫
exp{−
I∑
l=1
TAl (a˜l(j)c
A
l τ
A
nl(j))
−θpθ}dFan(a˜)dFAτn(τ)
D.2 Exporter i share of agricultural products purchased
in market n
Claim: The share of agricultural products purchased from exporter i in market n is:
p¯iAni =
∫
TAi (a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j))
−θ
ΩAn (j)
dFan(a˜)dF
k
τn(τ )
Proof: By invoking a law of large numbers as in EK, the unconditional probability
that exporter i offers the lowest price for an agricultural product in market n is also
the fraction of goods that market n buyers purchase from country i producers. The
probability that the lowest offer for product j comes from exporter i is the probability
all of its competitor offer higher prices. Let pAni(j) = p
∗.
Pr
(
pAnl(j) > p
∗ ∀l 6= i) = ∏
l 6=i
Pr(pAnl(j) > p
∗) = exp{−
∑
l 6=i
TAl (a˜l(j)c
A
l τ
A
nl(j))
−θp∗θ}
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Now, integrating over all possible realizations of pAni(j):
Pr
(
pAnl(j) > p
A
ni(j) ∀l 6= i
)
=
∫
exp{−
∑
l 6=i
TAl (a˜i(j)c
A
l τ
A
nl(j))
−θpθ}dGAni(p(j))
Note:
dGAni(p(j)) = e
−TAi (a˜i(j)cAi τAni(j))−θpθθT ki (a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j))
−θpθ−1
Therefore:
Pr
(
pAnl(j) > p
A
ni(j) ∀l 6= i
)
=
TAi (a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j))
−θ
ΩAn (j)
∞∫
0
exp{−ΩAn (j)pθ}ΩAn (j)θpθ−1dp
Notice that the expression under the integral is dGkn(p), so this is:
Pr
(
pAnl(j) > p
A
ni(j) ∀l 6= i
)
=
TAi (a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j))
−θ
ΩAn (j)
The unconditional probability exporter i offers the lowest price in market n is then:
p¯iAni =
∫
TAi (a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j))
−θ
ΩAn (j)
dFan(a˜)dF
k
τn(τ )
D.3 Market n agricultural price index
Claim:
pAn = γ
(∫
ΩAn (j)
σ−1
θ dFan(a˜)dF
A
τn(τ )
) 1
1−σ
Proof: A standard unit price index given the CES technology with which agricultural
products are aggregated by country n buyers (Equation 4.11) is:
pAn =
 1∫
0
pAn (j)
−(σ−1)dj

1
1−σ
This can be written:
pAn =
 ∞∫
0
p1−σdGAn (p)dp
 11−σ =
 ∞∫
0
1∫
0
p1−σe−Ω
A
n (j)p
θ
θΩA(j)pθ−1dFan(a˜)dF
A
τn(τ )dp

1
1−σ
where ΩAn (j) =
I∑
l=1
TAl (a˜l(j)c
A
l τ
A
nl(j))
−θ.
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Define x = ΩAn (j)p
θ, then dx = θΩAn (j)p
θ−1 and p1−σ =
(
x
ΩAn (j)
) 1−σ
θ
. Then:
pAn =
 ∞∫
0
1∫
0
(
x
ΩAn (j)
) 1−σ
θ
exdxdFan(a˜)dF
A
τn(τ )

1
1−σ
Using the definition of the gamma function, Γ(z) =
∞∫
0
tz−1etdt:
pAn = γ
(∫
ΩA(j)
σ−1
θ dFan(a˜)dF
A
n
(τ )
) 1
1−σ
where γ = Γ
[
1−σ+θ
θ
] 1
1−σ so we must have θ > (σ − 1).
D.4 Exporter i share of market n agricultural expenditure
Claim: The unconditional probability exporter i offers the lowest price for an agricul-
tural product in market n is equal to the fraction of market n agricultural expenditure
spent on products from country i:
p¯iAni = pi
A
ni ≡
XAni
Xn
Proof: Bilateral trade shares in expenditure terms are:
piAni =
XAni
XAn
=
p¯iAniX¯
A
ni
I∑
l=1
p¯iAnlX¯
A
nl
where X¯Ani is market n’s average expenditure per good on agricultural products from
exporter i. Cost-minimizing buyers purchase individual agricultural products to satisfy:
qAn (j) =
(
pAn (j)
pAn
)−σ
QAn
where pAn is the price index and Q
A
n is the total quantity of agricultural products pur-
chased in market n. Multiply the right-hand side by p
A
n (j)
pAn
× pAn
pAn (j)
= 1 and we get:
pAn (j)q
A
n (j) =
(
pAn (j)
pAn
)1−σ
pAnQ
A
n ⇔ XAn (j) =
(
pAn (j)
pAn
)1−σ
XAn
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Therefore, average spending per agricultural good from country i in country n is:
X¯Ani =
1∫
0
XAn (j)dj = X
A
n
∞∫
0
(
p
pAn
)1−σ
dG˜Ani(p)
The function G˜Ani(p) is the distribution of agricultural price offers made by exporter i
and accepted in market n. I claim that G˜Ani(p) ≡ GAn (p) ∀i. To see this, note that if
country n buys good j from country i, then country i must be the low–cost supplier:
pAni(j) = p
A
n (j). Suppose p
A
n (j) = q(j). The probability country i is the low–cost supplier
of product j is the probability that all other suppliers have prices higher than q(j):
Pr
(
pAnl(j) > q(j) ∀l 6= i
)
= exp{−
∑
l 6=i
TAl (a˜l(j)c
A
l τnl
A(j))−θq(j)θ}
Integrating over this for all possible realizations of pAni(j) ≤ q(j):
q(j)∫
0
exp{−
∑
l 6=i
TAl (a˜l(j)c
A
l τ
A
nl(j))
−θp(j)θ}dGAni(p(j)) =
TAi (a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j))
−θ
ΩAn (j)
q(j)∫
0
exp{−ΩAn (j)p(j)θ}ΩAn (j)θp(j)θ−1dp(j) =
TAi (a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j))
−θ
ΩAn (j)
GAn (q(j))
The probability country i offers the lowest price for good j in market n is
TAi (a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j))
−θ
ΩAn (j)
.
Therefore, the probability good j is purchased for a price less than or equal to q(j) con-
ditional on it having been purchased from exporter i is:
G˜Ani(p(j)) =
TAi (a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j))
−θ
ΩAn (j)
GAn (q(j))
TAi (a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j))
−θ
ΩAn (j)
= GAn (q(j))
Notice, this does not depend on exporter i. Even though the variation price offers
varies across countries based on their distributions of a˜i(j) and τ
A
ni(j), the variation in
offers actually accepted by market n is the same for every country. The unconditional
probability that an agricultural product was purchased for a price less than or equal to
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q(j), conditional on its having been purchased from exporter i is the integral over all
possible realizations of q(j):
G˜Ani(p) =
1∫
0
GAn (p(j))dj =
∞∫
0
GAn (q)dFan(a˜)dF
A
τn(τ )dq ≡ GAn (p)
Therefore:
X¯Ani = X
A
n
∞∫
0
(
p
pAn
)1−σ
dGAn (p) ∀i
Therefore, the average price offer accepted by market n buyers is the same for all
exporters, and:
piAni = p¯i
A
ni =
∫
TAi (a˜i(j)c
A
i τ
A
ni(j))
−θ
ΩAn (j)
dFan(a˜)dF
k
τn(τ ) =
∫
piAni(j)dFan(a˜)dF
k
τn(τ )
Appendix E
Agricultural Production
Requirements
Observable production requirements E(j) =
[
trop(j) temp(j) boreal(j)
]
represent
the ideal climate for product j cultivation. This ideal climate is estimated as a produc-
tion–weighted distribution across all 42 countries in my data set for the 130 agricultural
FAO items traded among the countries in my data and for which year 2000 production
and trade data are both available. For example:
trop(j) =
I∑
i=1
ωi(j)× tropi (E.1)
where ωi(j) is country i’s share of global product j production value. The table be-
low lists the agricultural items included in my data set and their estimated climate
distribution.
Table E.1: Agricultural Items and their Climate Production
Requirements
Item trop(j) temp(j) bor(j)
Alfalfa for forage and silage 0.27 0.73 0.00
Almonds, with shell 0.04 0.81 0.15
Anise, badian, fennel, corian. 0.02 0.64 0.34
Continued on next page
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Item trop(j) temp(j) bor(j)
Apples 0.09 0.81 0.10
Apricots 0.00 0.98 0.02
Arecanuts 0.47 0.50 0.03
Artichokes 0.11 0.84 0.04
Asparagus 0.08 0.73 0.19
Avocados 0.02 0.93 0.05
Bacon and Ham 0.00 0.90 0.10
Bananas 0.02 0.92 0.07
Barley 0.02 0.73 0.25
Beans, dry 0.18 0.71 0.10
Beans, green 0.11 0.85 0.04
Beeswax 0.43 0.46 0.11
Blueberries 0.00 0.89 0.11
Brazil nuts, with shell 0.47 0.45 0.09
Broad beans, horse beans, dry 0.05 0.80 0.15
Buffalo meat 0.73 0.24 0.03
Cabbages and other brassicas 0.13 0.78 0.09
Canary seed 0.00 0.84 0.16
Carrots and turnips 0.17 0.72 0.11
Cashew nuts, with shell 0.13 0.74 0.13
Castor oil seed 0.55 0.38 0.07
Cattle meat 0.06 0.78 0.16
Cauliflowers and broccoli 0.11 0.81 0.08
Cereals, nes 0.01 0.71 0.28
Cherries 0.01 0.89 0.1
Chestnuts 0.13 0.72 0.15
Chick peas 0.07 0.80 0.13
Chicken meat 0.21 0.65 0.14
Chillies and peppers, dry 0.18 0.60 0.21
Continued on next page
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Item trop(j) temp(j) bor(j)
Chillies and peppers, green 0.10 0.87 0.03
Cloves 0.10 0.85 0.05
Cocoa beans 0.01 0.94 0.05
Coconuts 0.26 0.65 0.10
Coffee, green 0.01 0.94 0.05
Copra 0.07 0.92 0.01
Cotton lint 0.06 0.89 0.05
Cottonseed 0.12 0.77 0.11
Cow milk, whole, fresh 0.01 0.86 0.13
Cucumbers and gherkins 0.07 0.72 0.21
Currants 0.01 0.77 0.22
Dates 0.06 0.90 0.04
Duck meat 0.12 0.82 0.06
Eggplants (aubergines) 0.24 0.71 0.05
Flax fibre and tow 0.02 0.84 0.14
Fruit Fresh Nes 0.03 0.94 0.03
Fruit, tropical fresh nes 0.25 0.60 0.15
Game meat 0.00 0.95 0.05
Garlic 0.15 0.79 0.06
Ginger 0.46 0.51 0.03
Goose and guinea fowl meat 0.02 0.96 0.02
Gooseberries 0.00 1.00 0.00
Grapefruit (inc. pomelos) 0.00 0.95 0.04
Grapes 0.05 0.88 0.07
Groundnuts, with shell 0.37 0.57 0.07
Hen eggs, in shell 0.13 0.75 0.12
Honey, natural 0.05 0.91 0.04
Hops 0.01 0.91 0.08
Horse meat 0.14 0.76 0.10
Continued on next page
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Item trop(j) temp(j) bor(j)
Kiwi fruit 0.00 0.98 0.02
Leeks, other alliaceous veg 0.05 0.81 0.14
Leguminous vegetables, nes 0.27 0.72 0.01
Lemons and limes 0.01 0.97 0.02
Lentils 0.09 0.80 0.10
Lettuce and chicory 0.04 0.84 0.11
Linseed 0.00 0.63 0.37
Maize 0.11 0.75 0.14
Maize, green 0.01 0.93 0.07
Mangoes, mangosteens, guavas 0.05 0.94 0.01
Mat 0.03 0.86 0.11
Meat nes 0.34 0.58 0.07
Mixed grain 0.00 0.95 0.05
Mushrooms and truﬄes 0.14 0.74 0.12
Natural rubber 0.13 0.74 0.14
Nutmeg, mace and cardamoms 0.03 0.90 0.07
Nuts, nes 0.07 0.82 0.10
Oats 0.06 0.59 0.35
Oilseeds, Nes 0.11 0.78 0.12
Olive oil, virgin 0.01 0.89 0.10
Onions (inc. shallots), green 0.15 0.69 0.17
Onions, dry 0.50 0.46 0.04
Oranges 0.02 0.95 0.03
Other bird eggs,in shell 0.01 0.95 0.04
Other melons (inc.cantaloupes) 0.04 0.83 0.12
Palm kernels 0.31 0.66 0.03
Palm oil 0.04 0.91 0.05
Papayas 0.06 0.93 0.00
Peaches and nectarines 0.01 0.96 0.03
Continued on next page
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Item trop(j) temp(j) bor(j)
Pears 0.03 0.90 0.07
Peas, dry 0.08 0.64 0.28
Pepper (Piper spp.) 0.01 0.89 0.10
Pig meat 0.06 0.81 0.13
Pineapples 0.02 0.95 0.03
Pistachios 0.00 0.95 0.04
Plantains 0.00 0.97 0.03
Plums and sloes 0.02 0.86 0.12
Poppy seed 0.22 0.73 0.04
Potatoes 0.04 0.83 0.13
Pulses, nes 0.12 0.72 0.16
Pumpkins, squash and gourds 0.02 0.85 0.13
Rabbit meat 0.01 0.75 0.23
Raisins 0.02 0.85 0.13
Rapeseed 0.04 0.66 0.30
Raspberries 0.13 0.41 0.45
Rice, paddy 0.08 0.78 0.14
Rubber Nat Dry 0.94 0.05 0.01
Rye 0.00 0.91 0.09
Sesame seed 0.01 0.91 0.08
Sheep meat 0.08 0.84 0.08
Sorghum 0.03 0.86 0.11
Soybeans 0.05 0.92 0.02
Spices, nes 0.04 0.86 0.10
Spinach 0.03 0.86 0.10
Strawberries 0.03 0.83 0.15
Sunflower seed 0.01 0.92 0.07
Sweet potatoes 0.11 0.85 0.04
Tangerines, mandarins, clem. 0.01 0.91 0.08
Continued on next page
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Item trop(j) temp(j) bor(j)
Tea 0.01 0.85 0.15
Tobacco, unmanufactured 0.02 0.92 0.06
Tomatoes 0.07 0.81 0.12
Triticale 0.00 0.95 0.04
Turkey meat 0.03 0.80 0.17
Vegetables fresh nes 0.30 0.64 0.06
Walnuts, with shell 0.04 0.91 0.05
Watermelons 0.02 0.91 0.07
Wheat 0.03 0.77 0.20
Wine 0.05 0.86 0.10
Wool, greasy 0.20 0.76 0.04
Appendix F
Manufacturing Sector Trade Cost
Parameter Estimates
The following table contains parameter estimates for the trade cost proxy variables in
the manufacturing sector. Producer fixed effects SMi can be found in Appendix B, and
exporter fixed effects exMi can be found in Appendix C.
Table F.1: Manufacturing Sector Trade Cost Parameters
Variable Coefficient Estimate
Border 0.58
Language 0.91
Distance 1 -3.53
Distance 2 -4.47
Distance 3 -5.16
Distance 4 -5.33
Distance 5 -6.78
Distance 6 -7.34
EU -0.61
NAFTA 0.12
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Appendix G
Obtaining Estimates of T ki
Equations 2.5 and 3.8 imply:
T ki = e
Ski
(
κkiw
αki β
k
i +ξ
k
Si
(1−αki )
i r
αki (1−βki )
i p
Aξ
k
A(1−α
k
i )
i p
Mξ
k
M (1−α
k
i )
i
)θ
Thus, to obtain an estimate of T ki , I first need estimates of wages, land rent and tradable
product price indices for each country. To obtain estimates of for T ki for the modified
model I use data on bilateral market shares and labor endowments to solve for wages
using equation 4.16. I use the estimated wages with data on arable land endowments
to obtain estimates for land rental rates from equation 4.15. I solve for prices using
equations 4.3 and 4.4 using estimated trade costs and produce fixed effects to calculate:
Ωˆkn =
I∑
i=1
eSˆ
k
i τˆkni
I use the same ns products I used to estimate the model in Chapter 3 to simulate the
integral in Equation 4.3 as follows, where the calculation of ΩˆAni(j) is analogous to Ωˆ
k
n.
pˆAni =
γ
ns
 ns∑
j=1
ΩAn (j)
σ−1
θ
 11−σ
I use wˆ, rˆ, pˆA, and pˆM along with the calibrated parameter values to solve Equation
3.11. Note that since I calibrate zSi = 1, differences in service sector productivity are
not included in the calculation of κki . Under this interpretation I am obtaining estimates
of
Tki
zSi
rather than T ki . Estimates are listed in Table G.1 on the following page.
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Table G.1: Average Productivity Estimates
Modified Model EK Model
Country
TAi
TAUSA
TMi
TMUSA
TAi
TAUSA
TMi
TMUSA
Japan 2.084 46.015 6.149 126.211
Italy 1.948 0.488 3.337 1.119
Ireland 1.778 1.181 3.156 3.035
France 1.24 0.271 1.624 0.649
USA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Germany 0.657 0.608 0.473 1.343
Austria 0.612 0.767 1.019 1.983
Finland 0.246 1.435 0.5 3.641
Netherlands 0.189 0.112 0.18 0.262
UK 0.175 0.625 0.145 1.506
Denmark 0.137 1.022 0.187 2.654
Spain 0.134 0.102 0.28 0.25
Israel 0.13 0.81 0.272 2.138
New Zealand 0.127 0.168 0.141 0.415
Slovenia 0.112 1.45 0.136 3.822
Malaysia 0.105 0.09 0.253 0.242
Hungary 0.089 0.011 0.098 0.026
Czech Republic 0.085 0.028 0.135 0.071
Canada 0.041 1.084 0.02 2.447
Sweden 0.039 1.097 0.059 2.733
Slovakia 0.025 0.009 0.024 0.02
Poland 0.021 0.02 0.033 0.053
Chile 0.014 0.012 0.029 0.031
South Africa 0.013 0.017 0.027 0.044
Portugal 0.012 0.029 0.029 0.076
Estonia 0.012 0.015 0.014 0.036
Continued on next page
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Modified Model EK Model
Country
TAi
TAUSA
TMi
TMUSA
TAi
TAUSA
TMi
TMUSA
Argentina 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.018
Australia 0.007 0.028 0.011 0.07
Turkey 0.004 0.011 0.009 0.028
Mexico 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.009
Brazil 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.014
Romania 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.008
Uruguay 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.013
Thailand 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.01
Russia 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003
Indonesia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Iran 0.000 161.104 0.000 404.152
Costa Rica 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.008
Colombia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Ecuador 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
India 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Kenya 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appendix H
Calibrated Production and
Utility Function Parameters
H.1 Production Function Parameters
Table H.1: Value Added Shares
Country αA αM αS
Argentina* 0.49 0.32 0.56
Australia 0.50 0.35 0.54
Austria 0.47 0.35 0.57
Brazil 0.53 0.31 0.61
Canada 0.41 0.36 0.58
Chile* 0.49 0.32 0.56
Colombia* 0.49 0.32 0.56
Costa Rica* 0.49 0.32 0.56
Denmark 0.42 0.39 0.56
Ecuador* 0.49 0.32 0.56
Estonia 0.40 0.23 0.48
Finland 0.55 0.3 0.56
Continued on next page
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Table H.1 – continued from previous page
Country αA αM αS
France 0.48 0.27 0.59
Germany 0.48 0.33 0.6
Hungary 0.34 0.21 0.53
India 0.78 0.28 0.60
Indonesia 0.49 0.32 0.56
Iran* 0.49 0.32 0.56
Ireland 0.49 0.33 0.53
Israel* 0.49 0.32 0.56
Italy 0.63 0.29 0.55
Japan 0.55 0.30 0.61
Kenya* 0.49 0.32 0.56
Malaysia* 0.49 0.32 0.56
Mexico* 0.49 0.32 0.56
Netherlands 0.44 0.30 0.55
New Zealand 0.40 0.32 0.50
Czech Republic 0.43 0.25 0.45
Poland 0.34 0.32 0.52
Portugal 0.54 0.27 0.54
Romania 0.52 0.34 0.54
Russia 0.54 0.38 0.60
Slovenia 0.45 0.50 0.61
Slovakia 0.39 0.25 0.44
South Africa 0.49 0.34 0.61
Spain 0.61 0.28 0.56
Sweden 0.49 0.32 0.56
Thailand* 0.49 0.32 0.56
Turkey 0.64 0.39 0.66
UK 0.42 0.38 0.50
USA 0.39 0.36 0.60
Continued on next page
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Country αA αM αS
Uruguay* 0.49 0.32 0.56
Table H.2: Intermediate Input Shares
Country ξAA ξ
A
M ξ
A
S ξ
M
A ξ
M
M ξ
M
S ξ
S
A ξ
S
M ξ
S
S
Argentina* 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.62 0.30 0.01 0.31 0.68
Australia 0.24 0.35 0.41 0.09 0.57 0.34 0.01 0.26 0.73
Austria 0.43 0.29 0.28 0.06 0.64 0.30 0.01 0.26 0.73
Brazil 0.34 0.42 0.24 0.13 0.65 0.22 0.01 0.41 0.58
Canada 0.31 0.36 0.33 0.06 0.67 0.27 0.02 0.26 0.72
Chile* 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.62 0.30 0.01 0.31 0.68
Colombia* 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.62 0.30 0.01 0.31 0.68
Costa Rica* 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.62 0.30 0.01 0.31 0.68
Denmark 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.13 0.61 0.26 0.01 0.22 0.77
Ecuador* 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.62 0.30 0.01 0.31 0.68
Estonia 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.10 0.68 0.22 0.01 0.30 0.69
Finland 0.44 0.20 0.36 0.08 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.33 0.67
France 0.34 0.40 0.26 0.06 0.63 0.31 0.01 0.23 0.76
Germany 0.18 0.38 0.44 0.04 0.64 0.32 0.00 0.21 0.79
Hungary 0.27 0.47 0.26 0.06 0.74 0.20 0.02 0.37 0.61
India 0.48 0.28 0.24 0.15 0.54 0.31 0.04 0.40 0.56
Indonesia 0.28 0.48 0.24 0.20 0.57 0.23 0.04 0.44 0.52
Iran* 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.62 0.30 0.01 0.31 0.68
Ireland 0.35 0.46 0.19 0.07 0.49 0.44 0.01 0.24 0.75
Israel* 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.62 0.30 0.01 0.31 0.68
Italy 0.33 0.39 0.28 0.05 0.62 0.33 0.01 0.27 0.72
Japan 0.25 0.37 0.38 0.04 0.62 0.34 0.02 0.27 0.71
Kenya* 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.62 0.30 0.01 0.31 0.68
Continued on next page
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Country ξAA ξ
A
M ξ
A
S ξ
M
A ξ
M
M ξ
M
S ξ
S
A ξ
S
M ξ
S
S
Malaysia* 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.62 0.30 0.01 0.31 0.68
Mexico* 0.33 0.37 0.03 0.08 0.62 0.30 0.01 0.31 0.68
Netherlands 0.28 0.35 0.37 0.08 0.68 0.24 0.00 0.24 0.76
New Zealand 0.33 0.26 0.41 0.18 0.47 0.35 0.02 0.26 0.72
Czech Republic 0.33 0.44 0.23 0.06 0.72 0.22 0.01 0.28 0.71
Poland 0.42 0.31 0.27 0.09 0.58 0.33 0.01 0.34 0.65
Portugal 0.29 0.37 0.34 0.10 0.64 0.26 0.01 0.28 0.71
Romania 0.56 0.29 0.15 0.13 0.55 0.32 0.01 0.49 0.50
Russia 0.48 0.34 0.18 0.08 0.61 0.31 0.02 0.40 0.58
Slovenia 0.43 0.30 0.27 0.04 0.71 0.25 0.02 0.32 0.66
Slovakia 0.47 0.28 0.25 0.04 0.72 0.24 0.01 0.27 0.72
South Africa 0.08 0.59 0.33 0.10 0.62 0.28 0.00 0.34 0.66
Spain 0.18 0.56 0.26 0.08 0.67 0.25 0.02 0.33 0.65
Sweden 0.14 0.51 0.35 0.05 0.58 0.37 0.02 0.26 0.72
Thailand* 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.62 0.30 0.01 0.31 0.68
Turkey 0.50 0.27 0.23 0.11 0.64 0.25 0.02 0.45 0.53
UK 0.17 0.34 0.49 0.03 0.58 0.39 0.00 0.21 0.79
USA 0.37 0.31 0.32 0.05 0.59 0.36 0.02 0.23 0.75
Uruguay* 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.62 0.30 0.01 0.31 0.68
H.2 Utility Function Parameters
Table H.3: Consumption Shares
Country λA λM λS
Argentina* 0.05 0.30 0.65
Australia 0.01 0.22 0.77
Austria 0.02 0.25 0.73
Continued on next page
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Country λA λM λS
Brazil 0.06 0.33 0.61
Canada 0.01 0.25 0.74
Chile* 0.05 0.30 0.65
Colombia* 0.05 0.30 0.65
Costa Rica* 0.05 0.30 0.65
Denmark 0.01 0.21 0.78
Ecuador* 0.05 0.30 0.65
Estonia 0.04 0.34 0.62
Finland 0.02 0.19 0.79
France 0.03 0.29 0.68
Germany 0.02 0.31 0.67
Hungary 0.05 0.31 0.64
India 0.30 0.27 0.43
Indonesia 0.13 0.44 0.43
Iran* 0.05 0.30 0.65
Ireland 0.03 0.31 0.66
Israel* 0.05 0.30 0.65
Italy 0.02 0.27 0.71
Japan 0.02 0.23 0.75
Kenya* 0.05 0.30 0.65
Malaysia* 0.05 0.30 0.65
Mexico* 0.05 0.30 0.65
Netherlands 0.01 0.23 0.76
New Zealand 0.02 0.27 0.71
Czech Republic 0.04 0.38 0.58
Poland 0.05 0.34 0.61
Portugal 0.04 0.39 0.57
Romania 0.14 0.37 0.49
Russia 0.12 0.37 0.51
Continued on next page
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Country λA λM λS
Slovenia 0.05 0.33 0.62
Slovakia 0.08 0.39 0.53
South Africa 0.03 0.41 0.56
Spain 0.03 0.24 0.73
Sweden 0.01 0.26 0.73
Thailand* 0.05 0.30 0.65
Turkey 0.19 0.36 0.45
UK 0.02 0.30 0.68
USA 0.01 0.20 0.79
Uruguay* 0.05 0.30 0.65
Appendix I
Base Solutions
I.1 Wages
Table I.1: Wages (Relative to the United States)
Country Modified EK Model Country Modified EK Model
Japan 5.36 5.42 Portugal 0.35 0.36
Iran 3.07 3.19 Estonia 0.35 0.39
Ireland 2.33 2.45 Australia 0.29 0.32
Finland 1.78 1.92 Slovakia 0.25 0.27
Sweden 1.47 1.60 Chile 0.21 0.21
Austria 1.21 1.34 Poland 0.21 0.22
Denmark 1.18 1.19 South Africa 0.21 0.21
Italy 1.10 1.24 Mexico 0.16 0.18
Netherlands 1.09 1.10 Argentina 0.15 0.17
Germany 1.02 1.19 Costa Rica 0.14 0.14
USA 1.00 1.00 Turkey 0.14 0.14
Canada 0.96 1.13 Thailand 0.13 0.16
Israel 0.93 0.94 Uruguay 0.13 0.13
France 0.92 1.11 Brazil 0.12 0.14
UK 0.82 0.87 Romania 0.09 0.09
Slovenia 0.76 0.75 Russia 0.06 0.06
Malaysia 0.60 0.61 Indonesia 0.04 0.05
New Zealand 0.59 0.66 Colombia 0.03 0.03
Spain 0.55 0.65 Ecuador 0.03 0.03
Czech Republic 0.44 0.49 India 0.03 0.03
Hungary 0.36 0.42 Kenya 0.00 0.00
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I.2 Price Indices
Table I.2: Tradable Sector Price Indices (Relative to the
United States)
Agriculture (pAn ) Manufacturing (p
M
n )
Country Modified EK Model Modified EK Model
Canada 112.84 2.82 0.95 0.94
Thailand 68.12 3.71 1.25 1.24
Germany 49.34 2.65 1.09 1.08
Indonesia 33.60 2.27 1.26 1.24
Russia 26.86 0.86 1.09 1.07
France 18.38 1.34 1.05 1.03
Sweden 16.94 4.66 1.16 1.15
Spain 16.02 1.49 1.08 1.06
Argentina 13.63 0.81 1.10 1.08
Austria 13.48 2.03 0.97 0.95
UK 12.80 3.09 1.07 1.07
New Zealand 11.18 1.69 1.17 1.15
Italy 9.81 1.78 1.07 1.06
Iran 9.30 5.50 0.37 0.36
Australia 8.95 1.01 1.31 1.30
Brazil 8.22 1.46 1.09 1.08
Finland 7.66 2.91 1.12 1.11
Colombia 6.62 3.10 0.98 0.98
Mexico 6.28 1.85 1.09 1.08
Japan 6.09 7.68 0.81 0.81
India 5.93 1.52 0.92 0.91
Slovenia 4.96 1.52 0.98 0.98
Kenya 4.39 2.61 0.90 0.89
Estonia 4.25 2.05 1.08 1.07
Continued on next page
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Agriculture (pAn ) Manufacturing (p
M
n )
Country Modified EK Model Modified EK Model
Romania 4.04 1.13 0.95 0.94
Ireland 3.75 2.09 1.10 1.09
Uruguay 3.65 1.32 1.18 1.17
Costa Rica 3.25 5.35 1.16 1.16
Hungary 3.24 1.21 1.07 1.05
Slovakia 3.14 1.65 1.03 1.02
Israel 3.07 3.21 0.87 0.87
Poland 2.99 1.08 0.92 0.91
Denmark 2.97 2.25 1.07 1.06
Czech Republic 2.85 1.42 0.94 0.93
Ecuador 2.81 2.86 1.00 1.00
Malaysia 2.79 2.52 1.30 1.29
Portugal 2.16 2.61 1.07 1.07
South Africa 2.09 1.10 1.12 1.12
Turkey 1.89 0.81 1.01 1.01
Netherlands 1.83 3.71 1.15 1.14
USA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Chile 0.87 1.61 1.15 1.15
I.3 Labor Allocations
Table I.3: Sector Share of Labor Force*
Agriculture % Manufacturing % Services %
Country Models Data Models Data Models Data
Argentina 2.12 0.70 51.61 22.7 46.28 76.20
Australia 1.97 5.00 53.87 21.70 44.16 73.30
Austria 2.08 5.80 53.95 30.30 43.96 64.00
Continued on next page
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Agriculture % Manufacturing % Services %
Country Models Data Models Data Models Data
Brazil 2.00 NA 50.78 NA 47.23 NA
Canada 2.29 3.30 54.95 22.50 42.76 74.20
Chile 2.12 14.40 51.61 23.40 46.28 62.20
Colombia 2.12 1.10 51.61 25.50 46.28 73.30
Costa Rica 2.12 20.40 51.61 22.30 46.28 56.70
Denmark 2.13 3.30 57.51 25.20 40.36 71.40
Ecuador 2.12 29.30 51.61 19.90 46.28 50.80
Estonia 3.01 7.10 46.19 33.30 50.80 59.60
Finland 1.95 6.00 50.02 27.20 48.02 66.40
France 2.36 4.10 48.26 26.30 49.37 69.60
Germany 2.12 2.60 52.38 33.50 45.51 63.80
Hungary 3.57 6.50 45.39 33.70 51.05 59.70
India 1.27 59.90 48.16 16.00 50.57 24.00
Indonesia 2.12 45.30 51.61 17.40 46.28 37.30
Iran 2.08 NA 52.35 NA 45.57 NA
Ireland 2.12 6.50 51.61 27.70 46.28 65.40
Israel 2.12 2.20 51.61 23.70 46.28 73.00
Italy 1.70 5.20 49.14 31.80 49.16 63.00
Japan 1.95 5.10 50.02 31.20 48.02 63.10
Kenya 2.12 NA 51.61 NA 46.28 NA
Malaysia 2.12 18.40 51.61 32.20 46.28 49.50
Mexico 2.12 18.00 51.61 26.80 46.28 55.20
Netherlands 2.41 3.00 50.35 20.20 47.23 70.40
New Zealand 2.51 8.70 51.90 23.20 45.60 67.70
Czech Republic 2.72 5.10 47.22 39.50 50.07 55.40
Poland 2.81 18.80 52.12 30.80 45.07 50.40
Portugal 2.10 12.50 48.08 34.40 49.82 53.00
Romania 1.93 42.80 53.02 26.20 45.04 31.00
Continued on next page
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Agriculture % Manufacturing % Services %
Country Models Data Models Data Models Data
Russia 1.74 14.50 56.28 28.40 41.98 57.10
Slovenia 1.69 9.50 69.69 37.40 28.62 52.30
Slovakia 2.94 6.70 47.37 37.30 49.69 56.10
South Africa 2.04 15.60 53.11 24.20 44.85 59.4
Spain 1.80 6.70 48.53 30.80 49.67 62.50
Sweden 2.12 2.40 51.61 24.50 46.28 73.00
Thailand 2.12 48.80 51.61 19.00 46.28 32.20
Turkey 1.42 36.00 56.94 24.00 41.64 40.00
UK 2.17 1.50 56.62 25.10 41.21 73.10
USA 2.37 2.60 55.02 23.20 42.61 74.30
Uruguay 2.12 4.10 51.61 24.70 46.28 71.30
*Both models predict an identical allocation of labor across sectors
Appendix J
Results of Agricultural
Liberalization Counterfactual
J.1 Increase in Agricultural Imports
Table J.1: Increase in Ag Imports over Base Solution
Full Liberalization Partial / Full Liberalization
Country 1−pi
A
nn
F
1−piAnn∗
1−piAnnP
1−piAnnF
Argentina 1.07 1.00
Australia 3.37 1.00
Austria 27.50 1.00
Brazil 6.96 0.98
Canada 1.03 1.00
Chile 15.30 0.79
Colombia 13.76 0.92
Costa Rica 2.23 1.00
Denmark 22.35 1.00
Ecuador 50.29 0.65
Estonia 85.36 0.98
Continued on next page
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Table J.1 – continued from previous page
Full Liberalization Partial / Full Liberalization
Country 1−pi
A
nn
F
1−piAnn∗
1−piAnnP
1−piAnnF
Finland 39.84 1.00
France 2.18 1.00
Germany 2.58 0.99
Hungary 5.27 0.99
India 1.69 0.98
Indonesia 32.01 0.54
Iran 1.00 1.00
Ireland 93.89 0.99
Israel 29.30 1.00
Italy 7.49 1.00
Japan 2.05 0.98
Kenya 265.28 0.95
Malaysia 4.68 1.00
Mexico 1.87 1.00
Netherlands 35.19 0.99
New Zealand 2526.35 1.00
Czech Republic 4.61 1.00
Poland 1.25 1.00
Portugal 42.46 0.98
Romania 3.29 1.00
Russia 1.07 1.00
Slovenia 6.83 1.00
Slovakia 9.32 0.99
South Africa 96.79 0.93
Spain 4.62 0.99
Sweden 6.18 0.99
Thailand 6.15 0.66
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Table J.1 – continued from previous page
Full Liberalization Partial / Full Liberalization
Country 1−pi
A
nn
F
1−piAnn∗
1−piAnnP
1−piAnnF
Turkey 1.90 0.89
UK 3.75 1.00
USA 1.08 1.00
Uruguay 25.61 0.95
J.2 Increase in Average Foreign Market Share
Table J.2: Increase in Average Foreign Market Share –Full
vs. Partial Liberalization
Ave. % Change in piAni from Base Solution, (i 6= n)
Exporter Full Liberalization Partial/Full Liberalization
Argentina 116% 1.00
Australia 252% 1.00
Austria 528% 1.00
Brazil 302% 1.00
Canada -72% 1.02
Chile 73% 1.00
Colombia 246% 1.02
Costa Rica 384% 0.95
Denmark 730% 1.00
Ecuador 124% 1.00
Estonia 192% 1.02
Finland 770% 1.00
France 930% 0.99
Germany 213% 1.00
Hungary 178% 1.00
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Table J.2 – continued from previous page
Ave. % Change in piAni from Base Solution, (i 6= n)
Exporter Full Liberalization Partial/Full Liberalization
India 513% 1.00
Indonesia 269% 1.00
Iran 318% 1.00
Ireland 41% 1.06
Israel 815% 1.00
Italy 227% 1.00
Japan 513% 1.00
Kenya 68% 0.97
Malaysia 903% 1.00
Mexico 603% 1.00
Netherlands 165% 1.01
New Zealand 213% 1.00
Czech Republic 785% 1.00
Poland 179% 1.00
Portugal 528% 1.00
Romania 939% 1.00
Russia 1089% 1.00
Slovenia 932% 1.00
Slovakia 329% 1.00
South Africa 116% 1.00
Spain 473% 1.00
Sweden 414% 0.98
Thailand 283% 1.00
Turkey 166% 1.00
UK 450% 1.00
USA 69% 1.00
Uruguay 903% 1.00
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J.3 Size of Shifts in Bilateral Agricultural Trade Patterns
Table J.3: Rank Correlation between Base and Liberalized Market Shares
Rank Correlation Rank Correlation
Import Market piAni
∗
, piAni
F
Import Market piAni
∗
, piAni
F
Argentina 0.73 Japan 0.66
Australia 0.70 Kenya 0.61
Austria 0.79 Malaysia 0.53
Brazil 0.76 Mexico 0.77
Canada 0.57 Netherlands 0.56
Chile 0.69 New Zealand 0.59
Colombia 0.70 Poland 0.77
Costa Rica 0.74 Portugal 0.53
Czech Republic 0.75 Romania 0.74
Denmark 0.56 Russia 0.57
Ecuador 0.73 Slovakia 0.77
Estonia 0.62 Slovenia 0.70
Finland 0.67 South Africa 0.64
France 0.75 Spain 0.68
Germany 0.75 Sweden 0.64
Hungary 0.75 Thailand 0.61
India 0.66 Turkey 0.75
Indonesia 0.69 UK 0.71
Iran 0.50 Uruguay 0.69
Ireland 0.62 USA 0.62
Israel 0.59 Japan 0.66
J.4 Increase in Real Income from Ag Liberalization
Table J.4: Percent Change in Real Income over Base Solution
Country Full Liberalization Partial/Full Liberalization
Argentina 2.84% 0.99
Australia 0.75% 1.00
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Table J.4 – continued from previous page
Country Full Liberalization Partial/Full Liberalization
Austria 3.14% 1.00
Brazil 3.08% 0.99
Canada 6.67% 1.00
Chile 0.62% 0.99
Colombia 1.18% 0.96
Costa Rica 0.39% 1.00
Denmark 1.72% 1.00
Ecuador 0.51% 0.96
Estonia 0.86% 1.00
Finland 2.44% 1.00
France 4.99% 1.00
Germany 5.30% 1.00
Hungary 1.99% 1.00
India 10.88% 0.97
Indonesia 16.16% 0.78
Iran 8.96% 1.00
Ireland 1.40% 1.00
Israel 0.70% 1.00
Italy 2.63% 1.00
Japan 2.57% 1.00
Kenya 0.80% 0.99
Malaysia 3.41% 0.99
Mexico 11.09% 1.00
Netherlands 4.22% 1.00
New Zealand 0.37% 1.00
Czech Republic 3.17% 1.00
Poland 2.65% 1.00
Portugal 6.57% 1.00
Romania 6.70% 1.00
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Table J.4 – continued from previous page
Country Full Liberalization Partial/Full Liberalization
Russia 16.59% 1.00
Slovenia 1.26% 1.00
Slovakia 6.03% 1.00
South Africa 0.26% 0.97
Spain 2.37% 0.99
Sweden 3.86% 1.00
Thailand 10.14% 0.85
Turkey 1.58% 0.83
UK 3.08% 1.00
USA 0.37% 1.00
Uruguay 1.52% 0.99
